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Introduction to the First Issue of KOME − An International Journal of Pure 
Communication Inquiry 
 
We are proud to present the first issue of KOME, a new academic journal aiming to serve as 
a scene for an innovative interdisciplinary discourse in the field of communication studies, 
with a focal point on basic researches. Our intention is to make a contribution to the discussion 
and research in the area of pure communication inquiry through the publication of both original 
research articles and other types of scientific communications. Submitted manuscripts are 
reviewed internally as well as by external reviewers, going through a preliminary selection by the 
editors before the double)blind review process.  
KOME was founded by two members of the Hungarian Communication Studies Association, 
Marton Demeter and Janos Toth, with the intention of creating a professional scientific journal 
for Hungary’s leading learned society in the field of communication and media studies, and of 
providing publication opportunities for results covering basic research issues of this specific 
segment of social sciences. The articles published in KOME are offered as an open)access 
publication, without any fees or charges for the authors or the readers, and using a copyright 
licensing approach that does not prevent them from copying and distributing any of the journal’s 
contents (except selling it for a profit) if the first publication by KOME, with an URL link and 
complete bibliographic details, is referenced.  
 
   
On Pure Communication Inquiry 
 
Since KOME focuses mainly on basic researches, the following proposal suggest 
(unexclusive) elucidations of pure communication researches.  
 
A  Ordinary methods of constructing communication theories normally presuppose a given 
concept and/or phenomena of communication; presuppositions of this kind give the 
primitives of individual theories. Explaining or proving primitives could not ) and need not  )
be achieved within the confines of  the theory includes them. Naturally, a meta)theory could 
challenge the postulates of a normal theory, and it could try to explain or criticize them; still, 
the very same meta)theory has its own primitives and postulates which could not be, and need 
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not be explained or proved by the instruments of its own: so any meta)theory is a normal 
theory in connection with itself. The order of theories is potentially infinitely successive: 
there are no logical cogency forces a maximal resolution for a given theory (while, of course,  
it could be reasonable to argue for an optimal resolution). 
The very fact that communication theories operate on postulated or primitive communication)
concepts necessarily holds for theories searching the right concept of communication, and for 
those of which try to eliminate it: since the categories of labelling are given, so are the results 
of categorization (though as a process it could be uncompleted or even unbegun). 
 
 
B  Theories on communication could be categorized in regard to the sets of communicative 
phenomenons they operates on. 
 
(i)  When theory A could exhaustively  describe phenomenons described by theory B, then 
theory A is an of theory B; 
 
(ii)   When theory A could exhaustively describe phenomenons described by theory B, and, in 
addition, phenomenons could not be described by theory B, then theory A  theory 
B; 
 
(iii)  When theory A could exhaustively describe phenomenons described by theory B with 
less primitive terms, then theory B could be  to theory A; 
 
(iv)  When theory A could describe  (at least a subset of) phenomenons described by theory B 
with higher relevant resolution, then theory A is 
 of theory B; 
 
(v)   When theory A could give postulates for phenomenons described by theory B with 
which phenomenons described by theory B (and theories C, D etc.) could be exhaustively 
described, then theory A is the  of theory B, and theory B is a  of theory A; 
 
Connections (i) – (v) are typical relations between theories; any ascertained relation AB 
could be considered as an intellectual plus, and, for a pure communication research, it is 
strongly required. 
 
Consider, that a pure communication inquire could be alternation, subsumation, reduction, 
specialization, grounding and modelling alike. 
 
 
C    A pure communication research could be imagined at least three ways. 
 
1     First, a pure communicaton research could analyze the postulates and primitives of a 
given theory, so concepts which are being used as given. Because of the fact that, unlike 
mathematical models, communication theories usually do not exhibit their primitive terms 
and presuppositions, a pure communication research has to reveal them. 
 
2     Second, a pure communication research  could analyze the occurances of the term 
„communication” in a given natural language. The after)come of a research of this kind could 
be multifarious. An empirical research could describe speech acts carried out with sentences 
including the expression „communication”. But the aim of a philosophical or conceptual 
analysis is much more than a pure description, because it could explore the logical structure 
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of sentences including a given expression, and, typically, it could indicate that the ordinary)
language uses of a given expression could be misleading in philosophy or in sciences. 
Furthermore, a genetic research is a pure communication research per se, which investigates 
(for example, with the tools of etymological analysis) the oldest or most basal occurances of a 
given expression. Genetic researches have serious tradition in not just historical or 
philological sciences but in logics and semiotics as well. Likewise in the case of questing 
ordinary language, genetic researches investigate language uses of a given community, but 
the genetic method is the stronger, because it’s outcomes are being held as normative, not just 
descriptive. 
 
3     Third, a pure communication research could analyze the possibility of a communication 
theory which could realize at least one of the relations mentioned  under B. 
 
 
D     So, a pure communication research constitutes innovation, but this innovation could be 
either construction or appliance. 
 
 
Research Themes for KOME 
 
Following the elucidations suggested above, we think that the broadly defined research 
themes below are the ones in KOME’s center of interest: 
 
1. 
. Research projects of this kind rise questions in connection 
with: 
 
 1.1. The possibility of communication 
 1.2. The concept of communication 
 1.3. The epistemology of communication 
 1.4. The gnoseology of communication 
 1.5. The ontology of communication 
 1.6. The scientific place of communication theories  
1.7. The horizontal adequacy of communication theories  (i.e. concerning a specific  
level of reality) 
1.8. The vertical adequacy of communication theories (i.e concerning multiple levels 
of reality) 
 1.9. Other basal inquiries in connection with the concept, the idea, the nature or the 
 phenomena of communication.  
 
2. 
. Research projects of this kind rise questions in 
connection with: 
 
 2.1. The presuppositions of theoretic communication inquiries 
 2.2. The presuppositions of empirical communication research  
 2.3. The application of extraneous methods to communication inquiries 
 2.4. The adaptation of extraneous methods to communication inquiries 
 2.5. The genuine properties of the special methods of communication inquiry, if there 
are any 
 2.6. The analysis of existing methods in the scope of communication research 
 2.7. Other basal inquiries in connection with the methods of communication research 
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 . Research projects of this kind 
rise questions in conncetion with: 
 
 4.1. The reflexive relation in the case of communication theories, i.e., communication 
inquiry as communication. 
4.2. The symmetric relations in the case of communication theories, for example, 
communication as information processing and information processing as 
communication 
 4.3. The assimetric relations in the case if communication theories, such as inclusion 
4.4. The relations between communication inquiries and other disciplines such as 
theology, philosophy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, social 
sciences, cognitive sciences, computer science and A.I. 
 
 
On the Contents of the Current Issue 
 
We were surprised by the numbers and geographical diversity of the submissions that we 
have been received, although we had to realize that a significant proportion of submissions 
was incompatible with our profile − we hope that the above clarifications on pure 
communication inquiry and prefered research themes will help our future authors in 
identifying our journal as suitable for their manuscripts. As for the content of the current 
issue, the reader would find examples of pure inquiries. The  paper #"$%

& argues that public access Television was a forerunner of today’s 
internet, as it strengthened viewers’ interactive capabilities by involving them in the 
production processes of video material. 	   ' %  
 

 investigates the semantic scope of the term ’media’ and then it tries to 
identify differences postulated essential in the structure and operation of the constituents of 
the institutional structure it marks, while the discussion On $    
	 " explicates the the main types of analysis and then applies its 
analytical methods on Watzlawick’s first axiom of human communication, and tries to show, 
that the statement that ((is either false or meaningless. Finally,  
        tries to show that the 
electronically mediated communication has transformed our notion of the relation between 
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 This paper presents the case of Public Access Channels (or Open 
Channels)  in a changing media climate. The author argues that Public Access 
Television was a forerunner of today’s internet, as it honed viewers’ interactive 
capabilities by involving them in the production processes of video material. It 
was a clear remit of these stations to train individuals to use visual media and 
become their own directors. Thus, it was argued, they would be able to better 
understand traditional visual media and would not continue to powerlessly live 
under their spell. Also, it would empower them by allowing their own content to 
be screened. With the advent of the internet, many of the above beliefs were 
realised. And, consequently, Public Access Television underwent a crisis, as its 
target audience migrated to online media, such as YouTube and others. However, 
its training remit is still valid today and, perhaps, more so than ever before as 
much more visual material is pushed onto viewers. Once stations realize the 
potential of the internet to its fullest (e.g. the need for training and the availability 
of unlimited channels), they stand a good chance to once again become an 
important player in video education and local engagement.








In a 2008 article,Geert Lovink decried today’s culture of ‘googlization’ ruling the life of 
many people (Lovink, 2008). According to Lovink, such selective searching is detrimental to 
the cognitive allroundedness he locates in earlier generations. One important aspect in the 
medial formation of this generation of general common knowledge was, inter alia, the 
broadcasting power of television. As a consequence, in 1974, three times as many Americans 
trusted their television news than do today (ibid.). This allroundedness of the TV programme 
has been a thing of the past for some time though. But despite the fact that television has 
continued to change rapidly, it has nevertheless been able to create new business models, new  
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viewer niches and new media realities. In recent times, this change is mostly due to the fact 
that TV has a new formidable foe, the Internet. According to a recent study, in 2009 German 
youths watched only three minutes a day more TV than they interacted with the internet 
(Medienpädagogischer Forschungsverbund Südwest, 2009).  
These facts the raise important questions regarding the education youths receive to prepare 
them for the digital (television) life, how their self realization will be shaped by new media 
and how certain TV applications, such as Public Access (PAC) and Open Channels (OC) will 
further impact on them. Lastly, these new manifestations also require a rethinking on the part 
of television theory. Accordingly, TV has begun to react to the threat of the Internet. New 
internet based services such as Hulu allow for watching TV series episodes anytime and 
Apple’s iTunes store is happily selling such episodes to willing customers. Add to that all the 
other available legal, semi?legal and illegal download sites for such data on the internet, and 
it becomes clear that, at least when it comes to dissemination, today’s TV does not have all 
that much in common with TV 30 years ago. 
However, this commercial and entertainment side of TV is not all there was nor is. Especially 
in Western European countries, public TV has always also been charged with education 
purposes and pedagogy, a fact which has largely been forgotten during the recent 
commercialisation drives of the medium. One particular niche of programming which has 
taken this need for TV pedagogy seriously, is the above mentioned Public Access or Open 
Channels broadcasting. Such channels arose in contrast to the large networks, no matter if 
they were commercial or public (Engelman, 1990). This niche brought local and educative 
content to the fore, aiming to narrowcast rather than broadcast. And as will become evident 
below, the Internet has profited from this older technology at least theoretically, if not 
practically.  
 
The arrival of these OCs goes back to the 1970s. One important contributing factor to their 
arrival was the introduction of satellite and cable TV in the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
most parts of Europe. The proliferation of stations and programmes, plus the different goals 
commercial television had set for itself, changed televisual landscapes forever. One 
interesting side effect of this was that a number of governments requested from commercial 
broadcasters an important feature for their consent to commercial TV: the introduction of 
Public Access TV, a genre explicitly created to allow ‘normal’ citizens more access to 
broadcasting tools ? Citizen TV. These were mostly local channels produced for and by local 
people. In Germany alone, over 80 of them went on the air, but they could also be found, in 
one guise or another, in other European countries, such as Luxemburg, Denmark, Austria, 
Belgium, but also in Australia, the US, South Korea, Brazil and Fiji (cf. Rennie, 2008). 
Today, in Germany there exist 63 Open Channels in most federal states, with the exception of 
Saxony, Bavaria and Baden?Wuerttemberg. Another German federal state, the Saarland, 
ceased its Open Channels in 2003 due to budgetary constraints and lack of political support.  
These channels served a very specific purpose: not only did they provide a forum for 
microlocal information; they also allowed normal TV consumers to become producers of 
broadcasting material. Furthermore, due to their specific rules and regulations, many became 
laboratories for civil action. Theoretically, these changes also instilled a large part of 
performativity instead of mere representation into an erstwhile one?way medium. This 
performativity would allow local citizen to present their material (and themselves) to, in a 
first instance, local viewing communities via cable or terrestrial broadcasting and then even 
broader and potentially global audiences via the internet.  
The inception of these channels then was largely legitimated by sociological discourse of the 
time, and there in particular that of the Frankfurt School with its emphasis on ‘authentic’ self 
formation, self realisation and self maintenance. Going beyond that, they were also early 
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electronic challengers of the public/private bifurcation when it came to broadcasting, an issue 
easily forgotten in times of ‘reality’ TV. These channels have since influenced the 
democratised and democratising way in which the internet is being used, having pioneered 
formats that would later mutate into chat rooms or blogs.  
In the following, I will analyze how some of these stations have dealt with the challenge of 
the Internet. In 2000 I undertook a comparative study of two such channels, ROK TV 
Rostock Germany and Manhattan Neighborhood Network New York (MNN), and analysed 
their self?understanding and programming structure and philosophy. At the time, much of it 
was still dependant on older media theories (Briel, 2005). In 2010 I revisited these stations 
and discussed especially their relation to the internet. It became clear that most of their 
understanding had now shifted to media theories related to distributed identities and networks 
(cf. Briel, 2012). Some of their earlier practices had vanished, some converged and other 
formats had been successfully maintained (cf. Busse, 2010).  
In a final step I will suggest ways in which TV and Internet as fragmented systems can learn 
from these stations and how this new media situation can be embedded in a (politically) 





The development of a two?way, participatory public media culture is not a new phenomenon, 
nor is it restricted to TV. Grassroots media, or media from below, have been around for quite 
some time, with alternative print media becoming a mass phenomenon perhaps as early as the 
1960s with the popularisation of underground magazines (Cf. Hoofacker 2009, Olson n.d.). 
This development also took hold of the airwaves, with ‘pirate’ radio stations springing up, 
such as Radio Caroline broadcasting from off?shore locations to Britain. And when looking 
at the receivers’ side one might even go back as far as 1750 and the beginning of the 
newspaper era, as was suggested by Anders Ekström (Ekström 2010). With electronic media, 
however, entrance barriers to participation were higher and two?way?communication would 
not begin in earnest until the 1960s and 1970s. 
   
In Germany, the history of Open Channels (Offene Kanäle) took shape in and can be traced 
back to the 1979 report of an expert group, entitled ‘Rules for the Open Channels’. Open 
Channels were thus defined as “a forum for all kinds of audiovisual material, initiated (also 
produced) by rightful users who are responsible for its contents; those programmes are not 
bound by any user guidelines or limits except the ones mentioned below” (Kamp 1997, p.18; 
Spielhagen 1996). 
The 1987 German Broadcasting Act (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), amongst other issues, also 
specified the running of PACs. Their funding was to be provided by a percentage of the TV 
licensing fee, which lies somewhere between 1% and 2% of the overall fee and continues to 
be charged until today. Their existence is not written in stone, however, as they have to be re?
licensed every five to seven years. As the above mentioned example of the Saarland shows, 
this means that it can also be switched off, depending on the political and financial situation. 
Despite the existence of Public Access Channels for over 40 years now, the idea of 
broadcasting as societal common property seems to have still not been anchored properly 
enough in people’s minds. As Kamp reminds us, PACs were intended to fulfil a number of 
valuable pedagogical services: In an Open channel, people are enabled ? without goal?
oriented actions on the part of the organisers – to 
 
? become more tolerant or remain so in their relations with others 
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? become competent in regards to media and topics 
? re?think their own views and formulate viewpoints on issues 
? address the public with their views and issues in order to become politically active 
? further develop their actions.’ 
 (Kamp 1997, p.18) 
 
Despite these strong arguments, PACs usually only re?emerge in the public’s mind when the 
issue of raising TV licensing fees is discussed. Due to the relatively low awareness and take?
up of PAC production and dissemination services in the general public, its services 
recurrently come under scrutiny by the public eye and especially conservative media question 
the whole package. As if this wasn’t enough, they then also have to go through rigorous re?
licensing procedures. Despite such counter pressures, these channels are continuing to 
strengthen and intensify their TV media work.    
Comparing programming structures of Rostock’s ROK?TV’s ten years ago with today, it 
becomes apparent that broadcasting has been extended from 2.5 to up to 5 hours daily, with 
reruns broadcast three times a day. This is still far from a full programme, but time slots and 
programmes have been stabilised and attract many more viewers than before.   
ROK?TV broadcasts daily, with new content screened on Tuesdays from 18.00 to 20.30, 
Wednesdays from 18.00 to 23.30 and on Thursday from 18.00 to 21.30. On the other days, 
only reruns are broadcast. Typical broadcasting content consists of music shows (the largest 
content chunk, aired on Wednesdays), news about film festivals, international fairy tales, 
interviews with BMX riders, slots for foreigners and related issues, local festivals, travel 
reports and other user generated content. It also has a cooperation agreement with the 
Institute for New Media at the University of Rostock for co?productions. 
Compared to the broadcasts of ROK?TV, Manhattan Neighbourhood Network seems much 
more like a complete and full broadcast station. It has four different channels, Spirit, 
Community, Lifestyle and Culture, and airs around the clock. 
But it is also active in community media involvement and equipment rentals, the second leg 
of PACs. Between 2005 and 2009, the last year for which data was available, it has trained 
over 12,000 people and has achieved an impressive record of studio and camcorder rental 
time and editing effected (Manhattan Neighborhood Network 2012).  
In 2011, MNN moved to a larger, more modern facility. Today, its web pages are 
professionally attended to, with much more content available and cross?overs with their 
internet pages and YouTube channels. 
In comparison then, it becomes clear that MNN has several advantages over ROK?TV: it has 
the more prominent location, its public acceptance is higher, it is staunchly multilingual and 
its funding is generally more generous, due to its funding structure. In operation since 1992, it 
is funded by Time Warner Cable and the RNC Corporation in a franchise agreement with the 
City of New York. Its annual revenues are in the lower double digit millions figure (thus 
significantly higher than ROK’s) and it employs a larger number of staff, approximately 50 to 
99. ROK is by far the smaller organisation, but a typical one for a German Open Channel. It 
also offers similar services and training to the public, and both of them have to deal with re?
licensing issues. ROK TV is overseen more tightly and is a public broadcasting station 
governed by the German state of Mecklenburg?Vorpommern, whereas MNN is less strictly 
governed, as it is more autonomous vis?à?vis governmental influence.  
 
These two stations are then typical for two distinct models of Public Access Television: the 
German (and in many ways perhaps also the European model) is managed by governmental 
broadcasting regulations and sees itself mostly as a media education institution. MNN is a 
much larger organisation and holds a special place within the US PAC mediascape, and it 
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sees itself more as an entertainment station and offers a large segment of its broadcasts in 
non?English languages. ROK’s funding structure is broadly in line with most other German 
open channels, , whereas MNN is more dependent on generous private money but also the 
insecurity and fluctuating funding that comes with that. On the other hand, it is able to react 
more quickly to market changes and has much less red tape to deal with.  Both of them are 
achieving significant market share in media training, but MNN is ahead of ROK when it 
comes to audience figures.   
Despite the levelling power of the internet, we are thus still a long way from global 
mediascapes and this is perhaps for the better as this allows competing systems to develop 
new best practices. In general, the most pronounced differences still exist between an 
American, commerce driven public access mediascape and a European, more government?
driven one. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The American model has 
to source its funding from foundations such as the MacArthur Foundation and the public and 
is thus more flexible than the European one, but any Europeans (and, presumably, a large 
chunk of the American audience as well) having had to sit through stations’ fund drives can 
attest to the annoying effect this has. Conspiracy theorist might even hold that this is an 
intended effect put in place by commercial media and conservative governments. But its 
European counterpart also has its work cut out for itself. It has to convince governments of 
changing political colours of the necessity to continue media education as a state funded 
undertaking, a laborious and drawn?out process. In either case, both of them have to 





When discussing changes within public access broadcasting, it pays to speak to major players 
in the field. In the following I will summarise three interviews with such media activists 
about what has been called ‘distributed cognition’ (Reilly 2010) and then analyse what their 
responses mean for the field of TV studies. 
In an interview on 25 June 2009, Bettina Pinske (Pinske 2009), then outgoing MD of ROK 
TV, stated that while it was true that ten years ago most of the Open Channel stations in 
Germany as elsewhere were worried about competition from the Internet, this was no longer 
the case today; the internet has become a complement to ROK and allowed it to actually 
increase its reach globally and attract new viewers.  In many ways, it provides a platform for 
the anchoring of programmes and activities, such as its popular music programmes. 
Nowadays this function has been taken over perfectly by the Internet. And since this 
programme segment especially appeals to younger viewers, it becomes clear that cognition 
here is achieved between the media and not on one single platform. Lastly, for the last ten 
years, financing has remained solid, as ROK has become a stable agent in the state’s 
mediascape. In this sense the symbiosis between Open Channel and Internet has been a 
fruitful one.  
Other officials from OCs echo these remarks. In an interview conducted during the viducate 
workshop on 1 October 2010 in Berlin, Jürgen Linke, Managing Director of the 
Bundesverband Offene Kanäle e. V. (Federal Association of Open Channels), largely 
confirmed Pinske’s views. He stressed that today’s young request easy access to media no 
matter which media they were. Oftentimes this is still not offered by Open Channels, as there 
is a certain element of bureaucracy involved, due to the fact that they are public institutions. 
This Linke considers one of the main barriers for OCs to recruit the next generation of 
content providers and users. When compared to the easy to use software and distribution 
channels offered on the internet, many of the Open Channels require much more formal 
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training and face?to?face interaction, something young people might not want to spend their 
time on.  
Linke also confirmed that the early use of internet technology by Open Channels consisted in 
making it a public relations tool rather than using its interactive features. It was used to 
quickly disperse information about OCs to wider and younger audiences, but not for 
programming or implementing new two?way communication strategies. This came only 
much later and it continues to be one of the main challenges for OCs. According to Linke, it 
is a matter of survival for OCs to (re?)define their role in the digital age and master the skills 
to successfully compete for user numbers and platform providing. 
This mastery would not infringe on other virtues of OCs, such as their central media 
pedagogy and skills programmes. What it does mean for those areas, though, is that they need 
to be updated to be compatible with new forms of usage and platforms. Thus, OC Berlin 
offers workshops on shooting mobile phone video clips, a strategy which allows both the 
broadening of the viewer base, but also the involvement of it. 
But Linke also sees other dangers coming from within the network of OCs in Germany. Fact 
is, for instance, that the large number of Germany?based migrants engaged in OCs before has 
dwindled recently, as they have begun choosing easier options such as the internet when 
interacting with peers. Discrete circles of digital community engagement have taken over 
from the broader, more inclusive aims of OCs, leaving the latter bereft of a diversity that had 
always been constitutive for their own self?understanding and the goal of strong minority 
inclusion.    
One other voice should be heard here, this time from the USA. In a recent interview 
(conducted 18 October 2010 in Nicosia, Cyprus), John Higgins (Higgins, 2010), a former 
board member of the San Francisco Community TV Corporation (SFCTC), stated that his 
entrance into community TV came with reading the book Guerrilla Television in the 1970s 
(personal discussion with author, October 2010, Nicosia). As a result, he has worked at 
Community TV stations in Ohio and California.  
While internet technology and philosophy is critical for the success of community media, 
Higgins questions any unreflected celebration of technology as saviour of community media. 
He mentioned the 2007 Benton Foundation report on Community media, which concluded 
from the gathered evidence that local media commitment was a much stronger factor in the 
success of local media than their celebration of newer and better technology (Benton 
Foundation 2012). 
For the future, Higgins predicts a continued growth rate of community media, taking place, 
however, under the threat of the changing of the institutional framework under which 
Community TV is working in the USA. This has to do with the fact that cable and satellite 
operators met with quite good success in forcing local government to diminish the former’s 
responsibility to community media. And this will force community media to painfully search 
for local sponsors, much more so than in the past. And it is not only the sponsors PACs have 
to worry about. This attack makes it clear that old media continue to fight upstart and 
ideologically inconvenient media organisations and the fact that such stations are having an 
impact on mediascapes. 
Already in 2008, Bronx Congressman Serrano defended the right of Public, Educational and 
Governmental stations (PEG) to exist and their need for government protection (McCausland  
2008). And thus, while PAC organizations have done the sensible thing and shifted their 
philosophical stances from a worried distrust to an enthusiastic embrace of new media, their 
services for media literacy are needed today even more so than before. And indeed, this is 
what many provide, as the example of Manhattan Neighborhood Network demonstrates.    
Having successfully concluded a merger with internet technology and created new 
administrative and creative venues and operations does not mean that the battle has been won. 
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Many battles remain to be fought. For one, and perhaps one of the most serious ones, is the 
fact that despite the acceptance of new media by Public Access, there still remains a gap 
between its usage and its presentation. An overwhelming number of portal pages of PACs are 
fraught with bad design, dead links and little evidence of understanding of the importance of 
such portals. Young users' main criteria for accessing material on the web is its aesthetic 
presentation (Thorlacius 2004). 
Here a technological as well as a philosophical distance is evident between the 
creators/managers of PACs and their intended audience of today. Many of the former still 
grew up with very bad copying machines and other ‘Inferior’ technology. This will not do 
today. For better or for worse, aesthetics has become part of the message and PACs would do 
well to remember that. They are involved in a selling process and thus need to take into 
consideration the needs of their consumers. This is one area where not much has changed 
over the last ten years. Other areas have improved remarkably; taking the web pages of MNN 
(mnn.org) for example, interfaces have become better, more material is available for 
downloading, the four available channels have been differentiated more and taken on separate 
identities, the offerings in Spanish have increased and the Latina/o community is actively 
approached, select content is available on YouTube and all MNN channels are available as 
live streams. But, and perhaps more importantly, activism is also not neglected. Applications 
for government media grants and Tactical Tool kits are addressed and producers are invited 
to avail themselves of them. Here a bit of Realpolitik is visible. MNN does not adhere to the 
‘prosumer’ idea of say, a Henry Jenkins, but it is very much aware of the fact that producers 
have different needs from users. The difference between the computer as a lean forward 
medium and the TV as a lean backwards medium is still very much evident here. And, 
judging by experience, perhaps rightly so. This is not to say that a user cannot become a 
producer; after all, this is the very thought that gave rise to community media. But this is not 
an automatic process. As the above quoted 2009 German study showed, only 5% of youths 
create sound files, 3% of them write weblogs, 2% write in online encyclopaedias and only 
1% upload videos. Compare this to 69% who write instant text messages, 69% who are part 
of online communities and 58% who listen to music online (Dworschak 2010, p.123), and the 
picture becomes clear: While they may not recognize the internet per se as a distinct medium 
their usage is exactly that: they use the web as a distribution channel but do not create 
multimedia content for it.
The above distinction is important. Most members of online communities of course produce 
written content and also upload the occasional picture. But many, if not most of them are not 
aware of any philosophical implications associated with these activities. For those they would 
have to rely on training in the same way as previous generations were dependant on 
McLuhan for television, Brecht for radio or Weber for newspapers.      
What youths are very good at is platform hopping, the switching of platforms depending on 
their location and need (e.g. INCLUSO − Social Software for the Social Inclusion of 
Marginalised Youngsters, n.d.) . And this is also something PAC stations have realized over 
the last years and therefore they follow their users across platforms and offer their wares in 
transmedial forms. This will be discussed further below. 
 
During the interviews, all three media professionals/activists stressed very important points in 
relation to the changing public access mediascape. First and foremost, it becomes clear that 
the internet has become an ally in many ways. These include timetabling, technological and 
personnel issues. Public Access allows for flat hierarchies and an optimum of user production 
via broadcasting channels. Pinske underscores the need for the professionalization of 
broadcasting structures. This indeed is an important factor to retain audiences and an 
advantage point for public access vis?a?vis the internet offerings which are still far removed 
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from achieving such iterative structures. Linke puts his emphasis on the missed interactivity 
which is creating large problems for public access. Those who want easy access to production 
and dissemination tools have already opted for internet sites and it will be an uphill battle to 
get them back. 
Another connected issue is that, typically, many community stations were founded by 
activists, who had a strong sense of community commitment, usually coupled with 
progressive and leftist politics. For them, activism had been the prime impetus to enter citizen 
media in the first place. These founding activists are getting on in age, and today there seems 
to happen a changing of the guard within community stations and organisations. This is the 
case on both sides of the Atlantic. Younger staff are willing and more able to tap into the new 
media market and are actively propagating convergence with the internet.  
Lastly, all three deny any overwhelming impact of technology on the public access 
framework and express their conviction that public access is robust enough to continue even 
in the digital age. In the light of Public Access’s own genesis this strikes one as a problematic 
viewpoint. It was exactly the lowering of price barriers that first of all made public access 
possible. While it is very true that it needed agency, theoretical and practical, to avail oneself 
of TV technologies in the 1960s and 70s, but it also needed such technological TV 
breakthroughs as satellite and cable TV. And, especially, when the rapid technological 
changes are considered that the internet has brought about in visual broadcasting, to 
underestimate theses technologies seems hazardous. This is particularly the case when one 














This technological digital change has not only affected public access, it has also had a large 
impact on the TV media sector as a whole. Media theory has to account for this change. This 
does not necessarily involve the re?invention of the media wheel as it were, but rather using 
parts of older undervalued theory and bringing them to bear upon the changed medial 
situation of today. One of those is the participatory culture theory, as first developed already 
in the 1950s and 60s by such media philosophers as McLuhan, Marcuse and Debord. It 
provides us with many of the tools to approach and analyse the new media situation. It could 
even be stated that it needed the new media in order to come wholly into its own.  
Case in point is today’s transmedial practice. Transmedia, oftentimes in association with 
storytelling can be defined as the usage of multiple media to tell disparate pieces of a single 
cohesive narrative (cf. Phillips 2010).  In 2009, William Uricchio, described transmedia as a 
new “lens” to be used to make sense of our multifarious environments. This lens can be 
directed backwards but also forwards into the future (Lim 2009). This typically includes 
different content on the internet, in broadcasts and in documents, all related to an overarching  
master narrative. A very good example is the US TV series Heroes, which makes use of the 
internet, comics and TV to add a variety of depth to the overarching storyline. That 
transmedia is not only a fad, but has already had an impact on the media industry as a whole 
is proven by the fact that since 2010, Transmedia Producer is an officially recognized US job 
description by the Producers Guild of America. 
There exists the belief that the new generation of digital natives is much more able to 
understand and use new media, and especially the internet, for all issues of life (cf. Media 
activism, 2012, Media Culture, 2012; Apperley 2007). This is at least somewhat erroneous. 
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As recent studies have shown (cf. Schmidt 2009, Hargittai 2008), while youths are very able 
to approach internet media without fear or worries, when it comes to serious research, they 
are challenged, perhaps even more so than previous generations who had spent more time 
searching for and appreciating scarce resources. And this is not just true for research; in 
general consumers of web content by far outnumber producers of web content. The above 
cited large scale German study also evidences that youths still by far prefer face to face over 
internet meetings. They also do not speak of the internet per se, but rather of applications 
such as FaceBook or Google, whereas older generations still see the internet as a monolithic 
medium. So in many ways, the young generation does not perceive media differentiations as 
strongly as older generations did. The historic battles between newspapers and radio, or radio 
and TV, and their ideological subtexts (i.e. written text vs. the spoken word, the spoken word 
vs. visualisation, etc.) do not seem to bother them when it comes to their media consumption. 
Transmedial content is received as any other, indeed welcomed and subordinated to their 
individual and group needs.  
And here Henry Jenkins and his research need to be addressed a bit more in detail. Arguably, 
Jenkins is one of the most vocal promoters of Citizen Media when it comes to participatory 
media in general. With his work at MIT, and since 2009 at USC, he has decidedly helped to 
shape academic discourse on digital media. In 2007 he published Convergence Media, still 
one of the most read texts on the convergence of old and new media. Here, especially its last 
chapter, ‘Democratizing Television? The Politics of Participation’, is of interest. 
In this text, Jenkins claims that convergence of media is a paradigm shift which moves 
content from being medium?specific to content that ”flows across multiple media channels, 
towards the increased interdependence of communications systems, toward multiple ways of 
accessing media content, and toward ever more complex relations between top?down 
corporate media and bottom?up participatory culture.” (2007, p.243).  
One global example he cites for such a venture is the TV Channel Current, currently 
broadcasting in the USA, Ireland and Italy. It is a platform for video watching, but also for 
production. Financially stable and having the support of the likes of Al Gore, it aims at 
introducing web?like content and sociability to and on TV.   
For Jenkins, media consumption would then move from an individualised to a collective 
activity. “Rather than talking about personal media, perhaps we should be talking about 
communal media – media that become part of our lives as members of communities, whether 
experienced face?to?face at the most local level or over the Net. (2007, p.245). Against those 
critics whom he labels as “critical pessimists” (Chomsky et al.), he calls himself a “critical 
utopian” who focuses on empowerment rather than victimization. And then he states: “one 
focuses on what we are doing with media [critical utopians], and the other on what media is 
doing to us [critical pessimists].” (2007, p.247) 
Here, Jenkins makes valuable points also relating to community media. Indeed, he uses 
community media as a blueprint for the new (commercial) media landscape. At first glance, 
this seems a vindication for such media. But what he overlooks is the fact that this larger 
commercial system is not driven by activism, as community TV is; the commercialisation 
inherent in the media system at large will allow for activist stances, but activities will not 
automatically veer in the direction of political activism. One might fear that it will lead to 
mere "consumerist activism". And even if the impetus is on media understanding, 
participation in media events such as popular casting shows will certainly increase one’s 
knowledge of the workings of TV stations, the advertising system and audience control. What 
is to be questioned, though, is whether such activities lead to a heightened understanding of 
the systemic and political repercussions such a system has. Here Higgins’ above quoted 
category of the ‘narcissist’ community TV star finds entrance again, with strong overtones of 
the Benjaminian chastisement of the star system in Hollywood in his Art in the Age of 
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Mechanical Reproduction. If this ‘communalisation’ of PACs and cyberspace alike is left to 
market forces alone, then, as a benign as it may sound, it will not be able to deliver the kind 
of activism engendered by present community media. And here Jenkins’ provocative question, 
“Is ideological and aesthetic purity really more valuable than transforming our culture?” 
(2007, p.249) does not go far enough. It is exactly those community media practices which 
should shape ideological and aesthetic judgements. Purity has not really been an issue, but 
community is. And a community which is sensitised to media even more so. Subjecting any 
ideological and aesthetic judgements merely to market forces has so far had mixed results at 
best. With the advent of mass media production facilities, this verdict was to cover 
production as well. Adhocracies and fandom are necessary elements for thriving cultures, but 
reflective practices still need to be learned. And here community media must be in the 
forefront, professional and self?reflexive at the same time. And, indeed, Jenkins further 
remarks on the necessity of teaching media literacy turn his argument into this direction. 
Problems do arise when media are viewed mostly from a commercial aspect. Case in point is 
entertainment4 where transmedia is mostly made fruitful for commercial media professionals. 
Jenkins’ is largely an American perspective which does not cover the European situation 
unless properly localized. Already from its inception, American TV history has a very 
different background than European TV history. American TV was solidly built on 
commercial companies, whereas in Europe TV developed out of state regulatory agencies, 
mostly postal offices. This governmental regulatory framework remained by and large intact 
throughout the last 90 years, with commercial TV playing a much smaller role than in the US. 
And therefore TV remains much more politicized in Europe. The fact that in Germany the 
conservatively ruled federal states did not allow public access to be established clearly 
demonstrates that they took a conservative standpoint regarding broadcasting media, thus 
disclosing a certain fear of these media if they were handed over to the masses. In retrospect, 
this fear was wholly unfounded, as the ‘masses’ never availed themselves of these 
broadcasting means for the first time, which also was a shock, but this time for the leftists.  
Other media philosophies highlight the fact that new media change the makeup of our 
cognitive processes. This is true for the way media influence our own identity formation, but 
also includes acts of cognition via and in media themselves. Thus, Erin Reilly speaks of 
‘Distributed Cognition” and defines it the following way: “We define distributed cognition as 
the ability to interact meaningfully with tools that expand mental capacities. [The 
resulting] Collective intelligence focuses on the ability of humans working together and is a 
complementary skill to the new media literacy, distributed cognition which can push our 
notion of pooling knowledge and expanding our capacity to include not just humans but the 
tools we use in sharing and expanding our knowledge.” (2010) Distributed cognition is 
therefore one of the new skills individuals have to acquire in order to survive in medatized 
times. And there are quite a number of other ones which require attention as well. In the text 
Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century, 
the author defines the areas of intervention needed to produce media sensitised active citizens.  
 
The long list is a call to arms for Community TV and media. The areas in which media 
participation training is necessary include play, performance, simulation, appropriation, 
multitasking, distributed cognition, collective intelligence, transmedia navigation, networking, 
negotiation and visualization (Jenkins et all n.d.)  
Here I would argue that this is exactly the point of intervention for public access channels. 
They are able to use philosophies tuned during the absolute reign of TV and broaden their 
educational approach to new media. This is today more necessary than ever.  
The chance Public Access TV has because of convergence is that it allows for transgression 
between platforms. This will also change content flow. It is changing from a structured top 
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down model (i.e. producer → aggregator → station → viewer) to a 2?way model in which 





(Content Flow, n.d.) 
 
Already Jenkins made clear that a distinction should be drawn between "interactivity," which 
he sees as a technological property, and "participation," which he considers to be a social and 
cultural response. He also observed that much of the viral content online right now has 
emerged from partnerships of new media makers and traditional non?profit organizations. 
"There is a new opportunity for alliances," he said. But he cautioned that non?profits and 
public broadcasters also need to be aware of ethical issues such as the debate about free 
labor—"not just in terms of uncompensated labor but the sense of consumer?driven content 
being exploited." (ibid.) 
 
Additionally, public media makers need to consider the "participation gap." He notes that 
participation requires time and specific competencies that are not available to everyone. He 
also cautioned that diverse groups of people must feel empowered to participate. "As exciting 
as it might seem to funnel content and have a DIY ethos, we still have a ways to go before we 
achieve the goals of diversity," he said. (ibid) 
Already during the 2008 Beyond Broadcasting Conference at the American University a 
session entitled ‘Mapping the Money’ stressed the fact that Public Broadcasting must also 
avail itself of commercial media. Thus, in 2008 PBS began to make some of its broadcasting 
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available on Hulu, a move not applauded BY all, as it was seen as a sell?out of public 
broadcasting by some. References in blogs would also be helpful to break into online 
viewership, as would social networks. The average age of a PBS viewer is 46. Ernest J. 
Wilson from the University of Southern California stated: 
“As we think about business models, I want to reintroduce the notion of why we care about 
this—representation, openness, freedom, democracy….If you don’t get this right pretty soon, 
the quality of democracy will decline and stagnate...and it will be our fault….We are way 
behind the curve in public service media in adjusting to what is taking place on new digital 
platforms. It is frustrating and ridiculous." (Schuler and Clark 2008) 
At the same conference, Larry Irving pointed out another important change: ‘Appointment 
television is dead. You carry it with you. You go where you want to go. You watch it when 
you want to watch it.’ As an example, he cited Slingbox, a mobile device to watch DirecTV 
when traveling (Schuler and Clark 2008). The new mobility of TV would then add to the 






Remembering the beginning of Public Access Television, it is good to note that much of it 
had been dependent on grassroots movements, on media activism. At least in Europe, these 
movements were then taken under the wing of mostly progressive governments and 
institutionalised. Many of them have existed for well over 20 years by now and while funding 
continues to be precarious, they have edged out a niche for themselves. The incision of the 
internet, as scary as it was at its inception, has in the meantime become a mainstay for these 
channels and has enhanced their programming power immensely, e.g. with YouTube clips or 
whole segments of programming being available for downloads or streaming. The reason for 
this alliance is that the internet itself sprang from the ideological bedrock upon which these 
stations were founded and was thus bound to create a positive impact.  
Something many segments of the public have not completely come to appreciate, though, is 
the second function of these stations, the media training they offer. And while their 
programming has perhaps become contingent in some aspects due to the larger offerings 
available on the Internet, it is this media training that makes these stations an invaluable asset 
today. It is their ability to sensitise the public to and teach media participation which gives 
them their added value today. Oftentimes, they already in the beginning had forged close ties 
with media and/or communication departments at local universities, as indeed ROK TV did, 
but, especially in the times of the internet, this participation needs to be addressed much 
earlier on. Many European countries have already adopted what used to be called media 
literacy programmes, but what are perhaps better called ‘media participation programmes’, 
for schools and other early education institutions. It is these that Open Channels need to 
target and to forge alliances with. In the often?touted information society, these channels are  
simply a sine qua non when it comes to citizen media education. Here perhaps also lies one 
way of alleviating their universal funding crisis. For this to happen, governments need to be 
convinced that these channels are a valuable instrument and a ready source to tackle media 
education tasks. Initiatives such as the digital storytelling initiative by Northern California 
Public Broadcasting (KQED Education 2010), the Beyond Broadcasting conferences (Schuler 
and Clark 2008), education course downloads for children and youth as made available by 
MNN, media on offer from the Independent Media Center, the Waves of Change Google map 
project or the European Viducate network, the last one partly funded by the EU, are best 
practices which bring out the best in Public Access cross?over into the internet domain. 
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As demonstrated above, the American and European models of Public access do not 
necessarily coincide. It is also for this reason of differing (and not only financial) bases that 
some of the practices by media academics and activists from one realm might not readily 
translate into the other. Case in point is Jenkins attempt to come perhaps too close to 
commercial media in its effort to secure public access. However, when it comes to 
participatory culture and the highlighting of the need of distributed agency, both models fulfil 
their remits and successfully attract a significant number of individuals willing to risk their 
own identities in a mediated environment. Both systems are not optimal and it might be that 
they need to take onboard lessons learned from other parts of the world, especially those 
where media activism does not just result in funding problems, but rather might be 
detrimental to one’s life. In 2009, a record 68 journalists were killed worldwide (Nichols 
2009). And it might be that media practices as resistance in such countries could remind 
Western media systems of the importance of such resistance (cf. The global village cat, or the 
Alliance for Community Media, which provide links to citizen media on a global scale). 
Thus, while the public access stations were forerunners of the kind of media intervention 
which would bring the internet to its own, they now reap the latter’s benefits by successfully 
applying its many channels. Over the last 15 years or so, Public Access has gone from being 
an ideological tool forged by (leftist) media activists against conservative governments to 
being a reservoir of media support and practices which help to participate in today’s media 
societies, from competitor to co?creator of new media consciousnesses. Activism is needed as 
much today as it was 20 or 40 years ago and the structures and networks created of Open 
Channels go a long way towards the goal of a Popperian open society embedded in a post?
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Abstract: Today, the expression "media" firmly retains a broad language function 
both in professional and public discourse, the essence of which is a signification 
of the auditory, visual, audiovisual and digital"electronic "press", including both 
the tools and agents. The term seems scientific from academic viewpoint and 
precise in public discourse. However, analogies drawn from some of its 
connotations, which can serve as a foundation to signify various media 
organisations, are adequate only for some segments of the semantic field of the 
term and for the roles of various entities described as “media” in the context of 
mass communication studies. In this paper we shall make an attempt to clarify 
whether the general name "media" and the more specific "medium" adequately 
marks the complex institutional system and its individual members to which it is 
applied in mass communication studies. To this end, after outlining the semantic 
scope of the term, we will try to identify differences postulated essential in the 
structure and operation of the constituents of the institutional structure it marks. 
These differences, viewed through specific types and cases, can either corroborate 
its use or can necessitate a refinement or rejection of its application. 
 
Keywords: media, producent, vertical integration, content production, influence, 




The English “media”, as the plural form of “medium”, comes from the Latin medius, which in 
turn has its origin in the Greek mésos (=έσος). In the following, we will base the starting 
point of our investigations of the entity referred to in communication sciences as “medium”  
and “media” on its first dictionary meaning, designating an entity  “which lies in the middle,  
or between other things; intervening body or quantity” (Webster 1913, p.908. This  
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generalised definition is also supported by Weekly 1921, p.914, Klein 1967, p.956, Shipley 
1979, p.228, Simpson & Weiner, 1991 , p.554, Valpy 1828, p.255, Andrews 1851, p.935, 
Niermeyer 1976, p.667, Donnegan 1831, p.808, Giles 1840, p.416, and Liddel and Scott 1883, 
p.944). The semantic content of these expressions strongly varies even in a particular 
language. In its variations, the scope of meaning can be broader or narrower. Particularly in 
different language versions, loss from or addition to the meaning is also traceable: in texts 
about mass communication—as it is quite well"known, its earliest versions developed in 
English"speaking countries in the 1920's—the meanings of the English variant will be 
relevant, where its meaning retains the “in the middle" and “intervening" sense but lacks the 
meaning components suggesting “impartiality", “neutrality", and “public" of the Greek and 
Latin terms (Demeter 2011, pp.110"111). The fact that this is not only linguistically relevant 
is illustrated on the one hand by the classical case of thinking about a “generalized symbolic 
media,”1 which plays a central role in human life"opportunities and mediates between, as 
Habermas would say, “system” and “lifeworld,” as well as between their subsystems. On the 
other hand, this relevance is also shown by the current discourses about the social"public role 
of the media, its potential in forming identities and attitudes, and its role in obtaining and 
maintaining power. It is easy to understand what significance the examination of the semantic 
field of the term "medium" has in this study from communication"theoretic viewpoint if we 
focus on some preliminary questions which can be constructed based both on what is covered 
by the English term and what is not. At the same time, it can also be put forward that the 
examination of these questions and the answers to them will serve as a theoretical framework 




Starting with McLuhan, scientific thinking about the media almost always requires a 
preliminary resolution whether the fundamental questions of the discipline should refer to the 
media itself or to the media content that is broadcasted or published. This requirement and the 
wide"ranging variety of conclusions one can arrive at as possible endpoints of the debates 
will force us too to make this choice with regard to how we will proceed. Mediation carried 
out by the media requires a complex activity technologically, structurally, and functionally, 
which, beyond its contribution to mediation, has the potential to be used to achieve other 
results as well. As experience suggests, these potentials may get actualised with changes in 
the zeitgeist and in individual and institutional interests, so we tend to side with the opinion 
that basic research needs to concentrate primarily on the mediator and only secondarily on the 
mediated content itself. We should also add that an interest in the latter should always remain 
relative to how the mediator selects and modifies the content. In order to avoid an 
arbitrariness of division in selecting the object of our research, by identifying an institution as 
“medium”, we will apply the criteria presented in the introduction: the prerequisite of 
mediation is the middle position. But before proceeding with this categorisation, we need to 
answer three questions:  
 
1. What is the status of those institutions which are both sources and mediators of the 
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2. At what extent does a process, which can be labelled as “transmission”, allow the 
editing of the transmitted content? How and where can the boundary be drawn  
between simple transmission and the transmission of an edited content, which retains 
only a level of similarity to the original? 
 
3. From communication"theoretical perspective, is it reasonable not to make a clear 
distinction between the following types of institutions by naming them uniformly as 
media? 
a. They transmit their own content to their target audience. 
b. They modify the content they received from external sources and then transmit 
the result to their target audience. 





A short answer to the first question is that the source of message in a process of transmission 
is not the medium but an agent of transmission. Here, it is appropriate to outline the 
difference between “mediation” and “disclosure”, which is an elemental distinction to make 
in this writing in order to emphasize either a mediated content or an agent responsible for 
initiating the process. While the role of the medium is to serve as the vehicle of the mediated 
content, the agent stands in the role of a producer: the agent produces the disclosed content. 
This distinction will also point at the middle position of the medium and the terminal position 
of the producer in the tritransitive process of transmission. If, according to the designated 
meaning of “medium”, we regard the “position between two” as an important criterion, we 
can supplement the question in the following way: What is the status of those entities, the 
position of which is between a source and its target (audience) in the mediation process? This 
wording makes it immediately apparent that the following conclusion can be drawn without 
any further analysis of the medium, which looks obvious from communication"theoretical 
perspective but has received little attention so far: the medium as an in"between can be 
identical neither with the source of the message, nor with its target audience. Furthermore, we 
can regard no institution or organisation as medium, if it transmits a content produced by 
itself, instead of one originating in an external source. 
Nowadays, when there is more and more emphasis on the research of the large"scale market 
and organisational convergence which can be observed inside  the  so"called media sector, 
this condition cannot be neglected because the convergence can easily reach a stage where 
the result of a series of corporate mergers and acquisitions will be organisations capable of 
content production and their distribution through their own media—publishing houses, 
televisions, radios, and cinema networks (McChesney 2005, Bagdikian 2000, p.xvii, Noam 
2009, p.104). These phenomena, as the “vertical integration” of the media, were brought into 
the focus of attention by media economics and regulation, although this process in fact 
escapes the scope of media studies because here, both analytically and in reality, one of the 
terminal members gets integrated with the middle member, which leads to the termination of 
the middle position, bringing about the dissolution of the medium on organisational level. 
Naturally, this does not mean that a vertically"integrated “media” enterprise cannot take part 
in the process of mediation as a sender instead of a medium. In order to be able to continue  
the examination of the process of mediation in this environment, where mass communication  
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studies traditionally concentrates on media institutions whereas these institutions are 
gradually disappearing, we need to distinguish the technological tools of mediation from the 
organisations that use these tools to transmit their “media content”. After this distinction has 
been made, we can include the cases when media enterprises transmit content produced by 
themselves because, in a technological sense, it can be regarded as mediation, where the 
medium in this tritransitive process is the technological architecture between the media 
corporation and the viewer, listener, or reader. The media enterprise here stands in a terminal 
position, which is incompatible with the designated meaning of the term “medium”, and 
because of which the term could not be used legitimately and adequately. If we broaden our 
perspective and we concentrate on the organisations instead of the content, then a well"
founded claim can be made that there is a well"defined segment of the set of organisations the 
categorisation of which as media is problematic: the ones belonging to this segment are those 
whose profile is predominantly or entirely composed of self"produced content. This 
problematic nature becomes particularly obvious when a programme produced by the media 
organisation is about the events or happenings of a situation produced, being produced, or 
planned to be produced by the organisation itself.2 If we dispense with the question of where 
the content was produced or where it can be positioned and what it makes available, and we 
concentrate only on the fact that a news item was communicated from point A to point B, or 
was made accessible in point B, then we will not be able to make a distinction between a 
"sender" and a "mediator", or between  "disclosure" and "mediation". 
Nevertheless, such cases are also possible, where the media enterprise behaves both as a 
source and a mediator, that is, certain parts of the content are self"produced and other parts 
mediated. Strictly speaking, even the following assertion can be accepted as true: institutions 
and organisations in median position cannot function purely as mediators. There is little 
probability for the realisation of pure mediation, which therefore needs to be handled as an 
ideal type, that is, as an analytical construct, having its reality as a point of reference, serving 
the researcher to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in specific cases. One of the first 
thematizations of this problem was in Habermas’s examination of the press organizations of 
classical civil public sphere (Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit). The description he published in his 
seminal work ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ about the press 
organisations at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century is quite close to the 
ideal type of purely mediating media organisation. For these organisations, both news 
agencies and professional journalism as a full"time job were unknown, and for the content to 
be mediated only one editor was employed, who, in some cases, also functioned as an owner, 
author, and reader; but the role of this person was typically limited to the topical arrangement 
of the ideas and writings of private citizens making use of their reason, and, if needed, the 
separation of information from commentary. This led to a situation where, apart from the 
(civic) interests of the financier, which limited what problems could and could not be 
discussed, and the norms of public discourse, the reasoning citizens could discuss the 
problems they regarded as worth discussion based on their experience and not according to 
the rules of a media organisation. Due to this, the press, at least for a short period of time, 
“remained an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a mediator and 
intensifier of public discussion” (Habermas 1993, p.183). 
The two main characteristics of the press organisations described by Habermas, the 
facilitation of a public conversation among citizens and a commitment of the organisation to 
disseminate unbiased and independent information, are properties that helped these 
organisations not only to  meet the technical role of the mediator but also to satisfy the  
criteria of objectivity and neutrality. For this reason, they can also be regarded as significant 
contributors to the development of the freedom of speech and expression.  
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However, since the publication of Habermas's work, several historical researches (for a 
summary of which see for example Curran 1991, pp.38"41, and Iosifidis 2011, pp. 31"33) to 
revise and reveal the facts have provided severe criticisms of his conclusions, which can also 
serve as an effective refutation of his analysis, for which reason, the reality of a medium 
behaving purely as a mediator on organisational level cannot be considered as corroborated. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter, however, to clarify the question whether there existed, 
exists, or will ever exist an organisation which functions purely and exclusively as mediator 
of contents produced by others. Instead, our aim is to provide some clues to the creation of a 
theoretical model making it possible to compare the results of empiria to an ideal situation, 
and by so doing, media organisations will be comparable not only against each other, in a 
closed circle, but against a consensually acceptable mode of operation. This objective is not 
purely theoretical—even though this would be perfectly acceptable in the case of media, as 
with any targets of basic research—, its significance cannot be neglected from a practical 
viewpoint either, as it renders comprehensible the various modes of practical application, and 
at the same time can serve as a propaedeutic of this comprehension. 
Pragmatic arguments can also be raised against the practicability of a pure mediating role. In 
the tritransitive processes, in which the mediation can happen, the mere existence of the 
medium can make an influence: a given medium is what it is, therefore, not something 
different, by which it determines the context of transition.3 This is true for media with or 
without an organisation. In media enterprises, another productive effect is also in play: while 
transmitting, the members of the organisation, who map (or transform) the object of 
transmission, as a media organisation, recreate the object of transmission in a scene provided 
by the technological architecture of the medium. As Stuart Hall writes about television 
broadcasts, which can be extended to include the audiovisual and digital"electronic press as 
well: 
  
„The ’message form’ is the necessary ’form of appearance’ of the event in its 
passage from source to receiver”, and „a raw historical event can not, in that form, 
be transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified within 
the aural"visual forms of the televisual discourse” (1980, quoted by Moores 2005, 
p.110) 
 
Why the act of transformation or mapping is the product of the media enterprise, and not of 
any other participant of the mass communication framework, becomes clear as soon as we 
name the processes which —from the viewpoint of the terminal members of the transmission 
process—are exactly the opposite of mediation. One of these processes is selfdisclosure, 
when it is the agent who represents oneself,4 the one who creates one's own media imprint 
and selects or creates a medium one deems suitable. In another such process, the initiative is 
not from the media organisation either but from the media consumer, which is called 
prosuming,5 when the media consumer maps various types of content and makes it 
available—mainly but not exclusively in internet environment, and inside the framework of 
participant journalism—through a medium to other consumers. 
For this reason, we have to make a distinction for media enterprises having their own 
organisations whether the content mediated by them is influenced by them or by an external  
agent, and, in the former case, whether that influence is necessary or unnecessary. The 
necessary influence on the mediated content exercised unintentionally by mediating  
organisations, which are nowadays collectively referred to as media, from now on will be 
called passive influence, which needs to be distinguished from intentional or voluntaristic, 
that is unnecessary, influences coming from inside the organisations. These influences can be  
 J. Tóth –Cs. Vass  25 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
KOME − An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry Volume 1 Issue 1  p.. 20"30. 
 
summed up in the category of “influencing”, which can appear in several stages—namely, 
thematization, problematization, and formalisation—of the transformation process, where the 
stages do not necessarily follow each other in the same order or are the consequences of each 
other. 
 
Thematization is when the media organisation—normally, in accordance with the interests or 
intentions of the owner or owners—applies a predetermined profile, that is, a preliminary, 
referencebased selection is made to determine what the owners allow to appear on the 
interface they provide. As it is quite probable that the medium, because of its own nature, 
cannot mediate content referring to certain objects, only those cases belong to the sphere of 
thematization where the exclusion or propagation of a certain content is subject to the 
voluntarist decision of the organisation. These voluntarist decisions can be further divided 
into those resulting from the internal regulation of the media company and those originating 
in conformity to external regulations—typically, state or international law—, nevertheless, in 
both cases the existence of thematization is a fact. Historical examples6 can be listed, as well 
as contemporary ones,7 to support the claim. However, it is more common nowadays that its 
application is linked to problematization and formalisation in current media environments. 
Problematization is the phenomenon where those attributes of the mediated content are edited 
with which the content in question refers.8 This activity can only be fully described as a 
selection from among the possible interpretations of the original content if editing the 
attributes presented during mediation does not make the original object or event, which it 
aims to map, inaccessible. If the meaning is tampered with, references to the original target 
can be obscured, that is, such a selection of the attributes of the mediated content can be 
made—by addition, omission, and substitution—that the modified attributes do not refer to 
the original event or object the mediation of which the content purports to be. This can 
happen in a way that the mediated content becomes the representation of another original 
event or object (→misrepresentation), but also in a way that it represents no original event or 
object (→false representation a.k.a untruth or lie). In problematization, therefore, “editing” 
signifies a decision"making process the result of which determines what meaning the 
mediated content can have when it is made public, which enables the organisation of the 
medium to behave both as a mediator and as a producent, that is, they can manufacture a 
meaning to the mediated content, while leaving its reference untouched. 
Nevertheless, the mediated content can be influenced not only by editing the referring 
attributes: there is a difference between what meaning the given content has when mediated 
and what meaning is attributed in the head of the target audience to the mediated content, that 
is, it is often a part of mediation to edit the perceptibility of the referring attributes of the 
source. Earlier, it was already mentioned that it is necessary to transform or map the mediated 
content in the media. However, formalisation techniques used during this transformation 
process can be used with or without an intent to influence. Those elements of technical 
editing which are not exclusively for the preservation or improvement of the clarity of the 
mediated content (e.g. improving image or soundtrack clarity or proofreading the script or 
article) are especially suitable for this purpose. What concepts and opinions are forming in  
the heads of the target audience is greatly influenced by the perspective of perception offered  
by the medium. The perspective of the camera is a good analogy for the perspective of the 
target audience relative to the content (Rutherford 2002, Jamieson & Campbell 2006, p.85); 
camera viewing angle and camera movements in general imitates human space recognition  
and proxemics (Bordwell 1977) while cuts, transitions and focus can frame mental activities 
in charge for information processing. 
We can firmly state about the relationship between “influence” and “medium” that the former  
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is not among the lexical meanings of the latter, but it is also true that it is not a criterion that a 
medium must be free from any intention to influence. It is a criterion, however, that a 
medium is in a middle position between the mediated source and the target audience, and it 
also makes a significant functional difference between different media whether they actively 
influence the mediated content or not. On the other hand, the current professional and 
colloquial usage of the terms “medium” and “media” lacks proper distinction and is often 
inconsistent when used for transmission organisations. Apparently, the basis of the 
appellation here is the technical"technological capability of the institutions to transmit, which 
is a common characteristic that we can call, borrowing the mathematical term, "a greatest 
common divisor”. 
The most obvious weakness of this appellation is the overgeneralization of the term “media” 
to an extent of becoming meaningless. It is hard to imagine any entity which is incapable or 
unsuitable to transmit any received impulse at least on technical level and at least in a 
fragmentary way. We are in the situation that if we take into consideration the scientific 
requirement of conceptual clarity —the essence of which is not to use the same name for 
different phenomena, and even if we do not have a strict definition, it should be possible to 
give a meaningful explanation about the phenomena being examined— we consider it 
expedient to make a distinction between institutions commonly called “media” according to 
whether the content is intentionally influenced and where the content they transmit is created. 
The following options exist for this distinction: 
 
● we can carry out an examination inside the set of organisations technically and 
technologically capable of transmittance whether they have any other qualities with 
class"creating power which are in conflict with the distinctive features of a “medium” 
● we can create additional labelled subclasses according to their identifying 
characteristics inside the class"designating horizon of the “medium” 
 
The first approach provides an opportunity to divide media enterprises on an organisational 
level into media and producents. Accordingly, the category "producent" will include 
organisations whose main profile is not mediation but primarily the disclosure of self"
produced content through a given architecture as medium to a given target audience. This 
approach, not from the previously discussed functionalist viewpoint but with focus on 
economic (Vass 1992; 2011) and power theoretical issues (Vass 2005; 2010) had already 
been elaborated by one of the authors of the present article. On the other hand, those 
organisations can be categorised as "medium" which primarily organise the mediation of 
content originating outside of them, and this mediation on institutional level is through the 
media organisation, and on technological level, through the technological architecture they 
employ. 
The second approach also provides an opportunity to make a difference between clear and 
unclear media from the perspective of content influencing. We call clear media those 
organisations, where the dominant part of the mediated content is not influenced intentionally,  
and unclear media are those where a dominant part of the mediated content is under any non"
passive, intentional influence from inside the media organisation. 
Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that a given organisation—no matter whether  
it is a clear or unclear medium, or a producent—shows symptoms of abnormal operation for 
an insignificant proportion of the transmitted content or programmes, and for this 
insignificant proportion, it will behave abnormally, showing characteristics of content  
management that can also be observed in the other two organization types. 
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Based on the above, we can assert that institutions capable of technological transmission can  






Operation Type of transition 
Regular operationcm  
Irregular operationum  Clear medium mediation 
Irregular operationp  
Regular operationum  




Irregular operationp  
Regular operationp  
Irregular operationcm  
Producent producing 
Irregular operationum  
 
Table 1. General types of effects on transmitted content 
Conclusion 
 
In the discussion above, we made an attempt to present and explain the current problems 
related to the usage of the word "medium". At the same time, by introducing the term 
"producent", and through the distinction made between "clear" and "unclear" media, we also 
tried to make a suggestion for a resolution. The results can confirm us in our conviction that a 
correct naming of the institutions capable of the transmission in the technological sense has a 
great significance inside the scientific field and can have great relevance outside the field as 
well. One of the points we need to emphasise is the application of adequate and precise 
concepts, which is attached to distinguishing truth from falsehood in the scientific field, 
establishing and maintaining, though often indirectly, another one of the key points: the 
scientific reputation of researchers. Finally, this brings forth the rising social"causal stakes of 
orienting human lives with the help of those with high scientific reputation. 
 
NOTES 
   1. In Parsons' AGIL"schema, the generalised symbolic media, that is, money, political power, influence, and 
value"commitments (Parsons 1975, p.104) serve as generalised interpreter languages to keep contact between 
the subsystems isolated analytically. This was reconsidered and developed upon from the viewpoint of 
communication"science by Luhman, distinguishing between language, distributive media, and symbolically 
generalised communication media (1995, pp.160"161), and by Habermas, differentiating steering media 
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replacing language as an action" coordinating mechanism (Parsons A & G's media) from communication media, 
preserving its dependence on language and the lifeworld (Habermas 1987, pp.273"282 esp. p.277). 
   2. A news programme produced internally by a media organisation makes an external event accessible more or  
less adequately.  However, events made available to the target audience via the airing of a self"produced reality 
show, chat show, drama series etc. have their sources inside the media organisation and can be regarded as the 
direct construct of the organisation. 
   3.  Naturally, the presence of a medium specifies not only the context of transition but also the wider macro"
environment into which it is integrated. For this reason, a situation can also arise where a medium is introduced 
into a macro"environment for the very effects of its presence. However, these cases go beyond the scope of this 
writing. 
   4.  There is only so much overlap between self"representation and the disclosure categories contrasted earlier 
with mediation,  as self"representation, which can be considered a special case of disclosure, is self"disclosure. 
   5.  The same way as McLuhan and Nevit have earlier predicted (1972, p.4), there’s a convergence not only 
between source and medium, but one can also develop between the source and the target audience. Its early 
conceptualisation on the field of economic theory (Toffler 1980, Kotler 1986) pointed out that prosumption, 
which unifies the producer and the consumer when production serves one's own consumption, poses a serious 
challenge in the postindustrial era for the market which traditionally mediates between the product and its 
consumer, and marketing activities bent on influencing consumer attitudes. For our topic, the significance of this 
convergence lies in the fact that the prosumer employs a high degree of decoupling between the transformation 
or mapping process and the media organisation, and thus it also filters out from the process of mediation the 
content producing and content influencing effects of this organisation. 
   6.  A well"known example is the one in 1956, when the three biggest radio networks of those times (ABC, 
CBS, and NBC) banned Dot and Diamond's song “Transfusion” on the ground that there is "nothing funny in 
blood transfusion", and Bob Dylan's "Love for Sale" shared the same fate for its references to prostitution 
(Gross, Perebinossoff & Gross 2005, p.201). 
    7.   Iran serves good examples for reference"based selection, where haraam contents or contents leading to 
haraam are censored or sanctioned on a religious basis, as well as, following a political logic, any references to 
the holocaust as a historical event (Hejazi 2011, p.57"58). For the same reason, any reference to Tiananmen 
Square massacre is closely monitored and censored in China (Reporters Without Borders 2009). 
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Abstract: This paper tries to show that framing a propedeutics for a given 
discipline necessarily presupposes some so-called analytical movements with 
which the conceptual frame of the discipline could be related to itself, and to other 
disciplines as well. The situation is the same with communication studies, where, 
as this paper proposes, many of the so-called axioms of human communication 
should have been analyzed. After explicating the main types of analysis, the 
discussion tries to apply its analytical methods on Watzlawick’s first axiom of 
human communication, and tries to show, that the statement that ’one cannot not 
communicate’ is either false or meaningless. 
 





 Since the role which analysis plays in the formal and the so-called hard (or natural) sciences 
is unquestionable long before, it’s unsurprising that social sciences also developed their 
analytic methods in time. Maybe it’s not odd to say that the state of a given discipline could 
be estimated through its analytical methods, but, of course, it’s not obvious that an analytical 
method should be explicitly called analysis. The main concern of this paper is to estimate the 
possible role of analysis in communication inquiry which could be informative in connection 
with the state of the discipline. For this end this discussion starts with the analysis 
of ’analysis’ itself, then it tries to apply the various analytical forms to pure communication 
inquiry. Finally, as an object-lesson, the discussion ends with the analysis of the eminently 
antinomic but much popular statement that ’one cannot not communicate’.  
 
 Analyzing analysis 
 
 The English word ’analysis’ obviously derives from the Greek ἀνάλὔσις which first of all  
means loosing, releasing or dissolving (Liddel-Scott 1996), but also means problem solving.  
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                   In the logic, or more precisely, in the dialectics of Aristotle ἀνάλὔσις means the process of 
the reduction of the imperfect figures into the perfect one. So analysis originally means a 
problem solving method, where the problem could be physical (as in the case of releasing a 
knot) and intellectual (as in the case of clarifying an ambiguous situation) as well. The 
manifold interpretations of the verb ἀναλύω (which stands for the English ’to analyze’) 
strengthen the notion that analysis means, first of all, clarification, because  ἀναλύω means to 
unloose, to undo, to set free, to cancel faults, to release from a spell.  
 
 But the fact that analysis is clarification could be affirmed without reference to its etymology: 
suffice it to say that the methods that call themselves analysis do clarification. Of course this 
short paper could not present a historically coherent picture of the concept of analysis, but it 
could delineate the most characteristic types. Let us suppose, that the logical structure of 
‹Analysis› runs as follows. 
 
(1)  Analysis ‹analyseri...;‹analysandumi...;analysansi...›› 
 
 The formula (1) means that the process of analysis should be interpreted as ordering, which 
requires three necessary constituents. So analyses include the matching of (at least) one 
analysandum and (at least) one analysans by (at least) one analyser, where the analysandum 
is the target of the analysis (which has to be analysed); analysans is the product, and analyser 
is the agent of the analysis. In linguistic terms, analysis could be interpreted with thematic 
roles
i
 as follows. 
 
(2) The analyser analyses the analysandum for the analysans. 
 
(2a) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(2b) The analyserAg analyses the analysandumT for the analysansP. 
 
(2c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(2d) /Analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 The formulas (2) – (2d) show that, logically, the analysans depends on the analysandum 
which depends on the analyser. Of course it could be assumed that in an „analysis” the 
analysandum depends on the analysans, but in this case the analysis should be accounted as 
fake, or the thematic roles should be inverted as in (3). 
 
(3)  (x)AG >dep (y)PRD >dep (z)TRG  (x)AG >dep (y)TRG >dep (z)PRD 
 
 The above mentioned consideration could be easily illustrated by a simple type of analysis, 
namely translation. Let’s suppose that an agent tries to translate the English verb ’to occur’ to 
German. Then the analysis would be translation, the analysandum would be the verb ’to 
occur’, and the analysans would be ’vorkommen’, and ’to occure’ should be 
precede ’vorkommen’. When an agent tries to find an adequate match for ’vorkommen’, 
then ’vorkommen’ will be the analysandum, and ’to occure’ will be the analysans. Of course, 
in the case of a simple translation, this kind of inversion could be easily perceived, but it 
should be kept in mind in the case of less common analyses too.  
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              But the indefinite constituents of the formula (1) show that (1) could be interpreted many 
ways depending on the indices of the arguments. It means that, for example, plural analysans 
with singular analysandum makes a different kind of analysis than  singular analysans with 
plural analysandum. Actually, every interpretation of (1) constitutes a type of it, so the 
following interpretations all have the logical structure of (1), but the same time they are quite 
unlike in practice.  
 
 On the types of analysis 
 
 The statement that definition could be interpreted as a kind of analysis maybe run against the 
philosophical tradition but it may be tenable upon further consideration. The logical structure 
of definition runs as follows. 
 
(4) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹definiendumi...;definiensi...›› 
 
 Of course a middle-sized library could have been crowded with books discoursing on the 
philosophical tradition of the single word definition; but there are at least two interpretations 
in connection with definitions that should be certainly mentioned here. The problem here is 
similar with the Kantian question regarding mathematical and philosophical definition (Kant 
1781). According to the first interpretation, definition should be considered as the 
determination of an intensional equality between expressions. In effect, here definition is 
fixation. For example, defining communication could be as follows. 
 
(4) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹communication;‹information processing.›› 
 
(4a) λzλyλx {DEFINE (x(y,z))} 
 
(4b) The definiatorAg define communicationT for information processingP. 
 
(4c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(4d) /Define/[V]λx λy λz λs [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 The formulas under (4) show that here definition fixates the intensional equality of two 
expressions, namely ’communication’ and ’information processing’. But a definition of this 
kind could be prosperous only if both expressions are parts of the language, and at least one 
of them is well known or retraceable to some self-evident fact or entity. The most famous 
example of definition of this kind is the circumscribe of bachelor as wifeless man, and 
definitions of this kind are usually called as analytical. Of course there are many wifeless 
men that could never be considered as bachelors, while no bachelor could have wife that 
squarely shows that analytical definitions could constitute semantical implications instead of  
intensional equality.
ii
 Definitions of this kind could be easily found in the field of social 
sciences, and they could be called as methodological definitions.  
 
 But there are another sort of definitions that mostly take place in the field of formal sciences 
including mathematics and logics. Here definition means constituting, as in the case of (5). 
 
(5)  Definition ‹definiatori...;‹fractal;‹a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension strictly 
exceeds the topological dimension››iii 
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(5a) λzλyλx {DEFINE (x(y,z))} 
 
(5b) The definiatorAg define fractalT for a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension 
strictly exceeds the topological dimensionP. 
 
(5c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(5d) /Define/[V]λx λy λz λs [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 It’s easy to see that in the case of (5) and related formulas (at least) the definiendum had been 
constituted by the definition. The ontological status of the constituted definiendum is an 
object of sustained controversy amongst philosophers and mathematicians, but the minimal 
notion that, at least conceptually, a new entity arises by the definition of this kind seems to be 
plausible as a general rule.  Definitions constituting new entities could be called real 
definitions.
iv
 The above mentioned considerations in connection with methodological and real 
definitions should be noted in the case of other analytical methods.  
 
 The next characteristic type of analytical methods is the so-called reductive analysis. An 
analysis should be called reductive when the analysandum could be eliminated from a 
description by the analysans. 
 
(6a)  Analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…››  
 
(6b)  Analysis ‹‹analyser‹ descriptionj‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…››  
 
 (6c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(6d) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(6e) The reductive-analyserAg reductive-analyse communicationT for information processingP. 
 
(6f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(6g) /Reductive-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [REDUCTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 Two important feature of reductive analysis should be mentioned here. First, the real products 
of analyses of this kind are the descriptions from where the analysandum had been eliminated. 
A reductive analysis affirms that all meaningful descriptions with the analysed analysandum 
could be (or even must be) alternated by descriptions with the analysant. So a reductive 
analysis often presupposes that the analysans is somehow more elementary than the 
analysandum: the analysis-concepts of Carnap, Russell or the early Wittgenstein were 
certainly of this kind. For example, in the case of ’communication as information processing’ 
a reductive analysis could affirm that the complex expression ’information processing’ refers 
to more elementary entities (or: consists of more elementary concepts) than ’communication’, 
and, basically, all meaningful descriptions containing ’communication’ should be alternated 
with descriptions containing ’information processing’ instead of ’communication’. But the 
term ’elementary’ could be interpreted at least two ways. First, it could be interpreted 
vertically, which means that the analysandum supervenes on the analysant (as, with some  
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              simplification, organs could be considered as entities supervene on cells which supervene on 
atoms). Second, it could be interpreted horizontally, which means that analysandum is a 
complex of analysans (as a table is a complex of its legs and leaf). But in both cases reductive 
analysis affirms that the analysandum could be examinable in the terms of the analysans 
(which statement evokes hard controversies in connection with the limits and fields of many 
disciplines, for example in the case of the philosophy of mind).  
 
 Second, interpreting the symbol of identity (≡)v in the case of the formula (6c) raises many 
problems. It is obvious enough, that, in the case of reductive analysis, the analysans and the 
analysandum could not be merely synonyms, because the analytic level of the analysans must 
be more elementary than the analysandum’s. So, first of all, (6c) could be interpreted 
extensionally, which means that the reference of the analysandum and the reference of the 
analysans is one and the same (of course, this way of interpretations could lead to serious 
problems in mathematics and social sciences. Moreover, it’s very hard to imagine, that a 
reference of this kind could be find for ’communication’ and ’information processing’). An 
alternative interpretation could suggest that that formula (6c) should be interpreted 
intensionally, which means that the meaning of the analysandum and the meaning of the 
analysans is one and the same. Here reduction should show that the meaning of the 
analysandum could be derived from the meaning of the analysans, which means that the 
concept for the analysandum conceptually depends on the concept for the analysans (and, of 
course, this interpretation raises all the philosophical questions in connection with ’meaning’. 
For example, it’s hard to maintain the idea that the concept of ’communication’ depends 
(conceptually, logically or even epistemologically) on the concepts of ’information’ 
and ’processing’). And, finally, (6c) could be interpreted methodologically, which means that 
phenomena could be described as communication could be exhaustively described as 
information processing - on a more basical level. Methodological interpretations are very 
popular in social sciences, and, in connection with ’communication as information 
processing’, it does not raise any serious philosophical problem – because of the fact that it 
seems to be simply false.  
 
 But the earlier mentioned presupposition of most reductive analyses - that the analysans is 
somehow more elementary than the analysandum – is not necessarily prevails. Instead of 
being more elementary, analysans could be held as a problem-solving appliance. This 
conception presupposes that the analysandum and the analysans are being able to fill the 
same cognitive function, while the analysans eliminates some – usually scientific or 
philosophical – problem which holds with the use of the analysandum. A similar view had 
been held by Quine (1960) who though that a reductive analysis of this kind is, in fact, not an 
analysis but a construction, where the analyser generates constructions instead of 
decomposing complex formulas.  
 
 A third kind of reductive analysis, namely explication (Carnap 1967) could be formalized as 
follows. 
 
(7a)     Explication ‹explicator‹explicandumi, explicandumj ... explicandumn ›;‹explicans››  
 
(7b) λzλyλx {EXPLICATE (x(y,z))} 
 
(7c) The explicatorAg explicate (conversation and dance and...networking)T for communicationP. 
 
(7d) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
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(7e) /Explicate/[V]λx λy λz λs [EXPLICATE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 In the case of an explication, as it could be seen by the formalism, an explicator usually 
orders only one analysans for many analysandum. Because of the fact that the direction of an 
explication is seemingly just the opposite as the direction of analysis (in a narrow sense), 
which usually orders many analysans for an analysandum, a question may be raised whether 
explication is an instance of analysis or synthesis, but this question should not be answered 
here.  
 As opposed to reductive analyses, a logical analysis won’t drive the analysis to ’more basical 
levels’ but it tries to brighten the logical structure of the analysandum. In this case the 
analysans belong to a dictionary of a logical system L, as in the case of (8). 
 
(8a)  Logical analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…››  
 
(8b)  Logical analysis ‹‹analyser‹ descriptionj‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…› Li›  
 
(8c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(8d) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(8e) The analyserAg logical-analyse (every communication is a kind of information processing)T 
for (x FxGx)P. 
 
(8f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(8g) /Logical-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [LOGICAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & 
Product (x,s)] 
 
 Here logical analysis could show that, for example in the case of (6e), if something is 
affirmed as communication the same thing must be affirmed as information processing. Of 
course formulas with entailment could not be inverted, so a logical analysis of this kind could 
not be considered as a class of definition. So the logical description under (8e) would be false 
for communication in every case when something could be affirmed as communication but 
the same thing (or event, or action etc) could not be affirmed as information processing. In 
other cases the entailment will be true. But it’s easy to see that (8e) can not be true since there 
are many examples of communication that do not contain information processing at all (for 
example in the cases of „fatic” communication).  
 
 An additional kind of analysis is the conceptual analysis which is concerned with the N 
natural (or ordinary) language.  
 
(9a)  Conceptual analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…›››  
 
(9b)  Conceptual analysis ‹analyser‹ descriptionj ‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…› N››  
 
 (9c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› N 
 
(9d) λzλyλx {CONCEPTUAL ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(9e) The analyserAg conceptual-analyse communicationT for information processingP. 
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(9f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(9g) /Conceptual-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [CONCEPTUAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 A conceptual analysis usually investigates the logical structure of ordinary language and the 
so-called normal usage of a given expression which includes the investigation of the 
conditions by which an expression could or could not be applied for an entity. So a 
conceptual analysis could serve as a propedeutics for a given discipline but, because of its 
firm binding to the natural language, could not be an instrument for setting it up.  
 
 The last kind of analysis should be mentioned here is the so-called connective analysis 
(Strawson 1992) which tries to explain the analysandum and its relations with other concepts 
without substituting it, which means that in the case of a connective analysis the analysandum 
could be a part of the analysans.  
 
(10a)  Connective analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…›››  
 
(10b)  Connective analysis ‹analyser‹ descriptionj ‹...analysandum, analysansi, analysansj…››  
 
(10c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(10d) λzλyλx {CONNECTIVE ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(10e) The analyserAg connective-analyse communicationT for (communication in relation with 
information processing)P. 
 
(10f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(10g) /Connective-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [CONNECTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 In short, connective analysis could be considered as a minimum concept of analysis, as 
Strawson writes: „Let us abandon the notion of perfect simplicity in concepts; let us abandon 
even the notion that analysis must always be in the direction of greater simplicity. Let us 
imagine, instead, the model of an elaborate network, a system, of connected items, concepts, 
such that the function of each item, each concept, could, from the philosophical point of view, 
be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its place in the 
system – perhaps better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind” 
(STRAWSON 1992;19) 
 
 If conceptual analysis should be considered as a tool for  constructing a propedeutics for a 
given discipline, then connective analysis should be considered as a tool for searching the 
position of it in connection with other disciplines. So it could be said without 
oversimplification that conceptual analyses should proceed, and connective analyses should 
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 An analysis of the so-called first axiom of human communication 
 
 The second part of this discussion would try to apply the method of analysis to a 
platitudinous statement in connection with communication, namely, that ’one cannot not 
communicate’.  
 
(11)  One cannot not communicate. 
 
 The idea expressed by this statement has been the subject matter of much discussion in recent 
time, and most communication theorists seem to accept it. The idea is referable with the so-
called Palo-Alto school, and, more precisely, with Paul Watzlawick (1967). The question 
may be raised what Watzlawick meant by it, and it should also be ask what different things 
could be meant by it. This paper shall not discuss these questions at all, but investigates 
whether the idea, when understand in a certain way, could be true or not.
vi
 
 It’s obvious at first sight that in the statement (11) the expression ’communicating’ falls 
under an act-category, but it’s far more obscure what the reference of ’one’ could be. 
Anyway, the logical structure of (11) could be formalized as follows: 
 
(11a)  ‹x› ‹Fx›  
 
 which means that it’s not possible for an x that x is not F, and it could be transformed as 
(11b) shows; 
 
(11b)  ‹x› ฀‹Fx› 
 
 which means that it’s necessary for an x that x is F. So the most broad interpretation of (11) 
says that everything must communicate, which could be narrowed by the famous Quineian 
approach as every being must communicate.
vii
 As it will be seen, this narrower interpretation 
still suffers from philosophical problems but, at least, liberates non-existent entities from the 
compulsion of communication. Since in logic the substantive verb ’to be’ could not be 
handled as a predicate, but as a quantifier, the undermentioned interpretations both have the 
logical form of (11b). 
 
(11ba)  If x exists, than x must communicate. 
 
(11bb)  If x communicates, than x must exist. 
 
 (11ba) says that communication includes
viii
 existence, because from (11ba) it follows by 
modus tollens that if x does not communicate it could not exist and by modus ponens it is 
impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x is non-existent than x is 
free to communicate or not.
ix
 (11bb) rather says that existence includes communication, 
because from (11bb) it follows by modus tollens that if x do not exist it could not 
communicate and by modus ponens it is impossible for x that it exists and do not 
communicate; but when x does not communicate it is free to be or not to be. It could be seen 
that (11ba) and (11bb) contradict each other because (11bb) allows x to be and not to 
communicate which is impossible by (11ba). And, because of it, (11bb) contradicts to the 
statement that one cannot not communicate. But with a Quineian paraphrase (11b) could be 
interpreted in a third way as follows. 
 
(11bc)  To be is to communicate. 
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 Consider that (11bc) expresses and identity statement
x; then it seems that the meaning of ’to 
be’ is the same as the meaning of ’to communicate’.xi Consider again that (11bc) could be               
regarded as any kind of analysis from definition to reductive analysis etc. Then the question 
may be raised: which component of (11bc)  is the analysandum, and which one is the 
analysans? (11bca) and (11bcb) show the difference. 
 
(11bca)  Analysis ‹analyseri...;‹to be...;to communicate.›› 
 
(11bcb)  Analysis ‹analyserj...;‹to communicate...;to be.›› 
 
 In the case of the former, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of existence, while he 
takes the meaning of communication for granted. In the case of the latter, the analyser tries to 
explicate the meaning of communication, while he takes the meaning of existence for granted. 
But in both cases, ’to communicate’ entails ’to be’ and ’to be’ entails ’to communicate’, so 
the logical connective between the concept of communication and the concept of existence is 
biconditional (iff). It means that, literally, everything that communicates exists, and 
everything that exist communicates. However, this biconditional evokes many problems in 
both directions that could not be discussed here in details, but two considerations should be 
proposed. First, the statement that which communicates exist seems intuitively true but trivial 
since it’s hard to imagine anything which communicates in spite of the fact that it do not exist 
or, at least, it must had been existed. But the same could be predicated on almost every verb 
say ’to sit’ or ’to see’ etc, so this statement is not too informative. Second, the statement that 
which exists communicates seems intuitively problematic since there are entities that not 
communicates in the strict sense of the word ’to communicate’, for example, it’s hard to say 
that an armchair or the Milky Way communicates. But this second statement is obviously far 
more interesting than the first one, since the theological interpretation of communication 
could corroborate the conception that which exists communicates.
xii
 Of course an analysis of 
this interpretation could not be performed here.  
 Naturally, the idea behind the statement (11) surely narrows the scope of predication to 
human agents, which is revealable from the original text of Watzlawick’s. Though (11) is the 
most quoted form of the original idea – which leads, as it was discussed above, to 
indefensible or, at least, problematic consequences – a refined interpretation of the idea may 
be proved tenable. Consider the statement expressed by (12). 
 
(12)  A human agent cannot not communicate.  
 
 The logical form of (12) is: 
 
(12a)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x›xiii 
 
 where F signifies the property of being a human agent, and G signifies the property of being 
in communication. Then (12a) is the logical expression of the proposition that it is impossible 
for an entity to be a human agent and not to be in communication. This statement is 
equivalent with (12b) 
 
(12b)  Fx  ฀G‹x›xiv 
 
 which expresses the proposition that is necessary for an entity that if it is a human agent than 
it communicates. Both formulas allow not-human-agents to communicate (or not). Since the  
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              The argumentation, which concludes to the statement that one cannot not communicate could 




(12ca)  A human agent cannot not behave. 
 








 Now consider the logical structure of the argumentation. 
 
(12da)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x› 
 
(12db)  ‹x› Gx  H‹x› 
 
(12dc)  ‹‹x› Fx  G‹x››  ‹‹x› Gx  H‹x››  ‹‹x› Fx  H‹x›› 
 
 which is equivalent with (12ea)-(12ec) 
 
(12ea)  ‹x› Fx  ฀G‹x› 
 
(12eb)  ‹x› Gx  ฀H‹x› 
 
(12ec)  ‹‹x› Fx  ฀G‹x››  ‹‹x› Gx  ฀H‹x››  ‹‹x› Fx  ฀H‹x›› 
 
 which means that if ’to behave’ includes ’to be a human agent’ and ’to communicate’ 
includes ’to behave’ than ’to communicate’ includes ’to be a human agent’.xix In any way 
soever, this deduction seems correct, but only if its premisses are acceptable. However, this 
discussion tries to show that they are deeply problematical. 
 
 The first premiss says that a human agent cannot not behave. This statement lies on the 
presupposition that there is no anti-behavior, or, in other words, behavior has no opposite. 
But this is nonsense, and argumentation must not have a counter-example to show its 
absurdity.
xx
 Consider first, that the application of any expression presupposes a rule by which 
it is decidable whether it could or could not be predicated for an entity.
xxi
 If anything an agent 
does is behaviour, then ’to do’ entails ’to behave’; if an agent must (in every occasion) do 
something, then ’to do’ includes ’to be’. But this is not suitable for the normal use of the 
terms ’to do’, ’to behave’ and ’to be’, nor does it have any reasonably plus for a scientific 
language. Second, if a predicate or property must be stated for every argument in its 
extension then the application of that predicate or property is apodictical, in other words, 
analytical. It means that the meaning of the predicate is part of the meaning of the argument. 
So, if human agents must behave (in every occasion) then the meaning of ’to behave’ is part 
of the meaning of ’to be a human agent’, which seems to be absurd. And, finally, the reason 
of using a descriptive expression is that it could be true or false. When, in an observable 
situation, any state or action should be described as behaviour in any case, then the 
hypothesis that a human agent cannot not behave could not be falsified. But there is massive  
M. Demeter                                                                                                                               41 
                                                                                                                                                                                
KOME − An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry Volume 1 Issue 1  p. 31-45. 
 
 
 tradition behind the rule that refutability is one of the key requirements for any scientific 
hypothesis.  
 
The situation is the very same with (12cb) which states that all behaviour in an interactional 
situation is communication. When it cannot be decided whether a behaviour is 
communication or not, then either there is no adequate rule for the application of both 
expressions, namely, ’communication’ and ’behaviour’ or they are synonyms, which is 
absurd. Furthermore, the complex expression ’behaviour in an interactional situation’ uses an 
expression, namely interaction, which is often used as a synonym for communication in 
ordinary language.  In this latter case (12cb) would not be absurd but trivial.
xxii
 And once 
again, if the question whether a behaviour in an interactional situation is communication or 
not could not be raised, than using both expressions has no scientific values in the world.
xxiii
  
 After all, this paper proposes that the incapabilities derive from accepting the analyzed 
statement are based on a more fundamental misconception which should be explicated. This 
misconception derives from confusing communication with the fact, that every act and state 
could be considered as communication. This consideration, however, could be either true or 
false.
xxiv
 Let us consider a situation which is similar to an example of Watzlawick. An agent 
A is sitting on a pew with closed eyes, while an agent B tries to setting up hypotheses about 
A. Here the multifariousness of the hypotheses is the most conspicuous thing, since B could 
think that, for example: 
 
(13a)  A does not want to communicate with B. 
 
(13b)  A likes to be shown mysterious, and he wants to be addressed by B. 
 
(13c)  A is sleeping. 
 
(13d)  A is dead. 
 
(13e)  A is in prayer. 
 
 And so on.  The question could be raised: in which cases could anybody say that A 
communicates with B? In ordinary language the answer is easy, since only the cases (12a) 
and (12b) could be considered as communication between A and B, while (13c) and (13d) are 
not communications at all, and (13e) should be considered as a communication between A 
and C, namely God. Moreover, the propositions expressed by (13a) and (13b) contradict each 
other, so (at least) one of them should be false.   
 
 Of course objections could be made against this argumentation: one can say (with 
Watzlawick) that in the case of (13a) A communicates, that he don’t want to communicate 
with B; in the case of (13b) A communicates, that he wants to communicate with B; in the 
case of (13c) A (or, at least, his body) communicates, that he is sleeping; in the case of (13d) 
the body of A communicates, that A is dead and in the case of (13e) A communicates with 
God and in addition, communicates to B that he communicates with God. But these 
objections confuse the mental state of B with the communication between A and B by all 
odds. This is only the mental capacities of an agent which enables him considering practically 
anything as communication. What is more, a human agent could consider not just other 
agent’s actions and states as communications, but his own mental states as well.xxv And the 
situation is the same with any physical, mental, social or ideal object in the past, in the 
present and in the future, with actual and with possible, or even impossible ones.
xxvi
 Still,  
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 there is an exceptionally odd shade in the statement that A thinks that a round square 
communicates with him.  
  
              So there is a capital difference between the following cases: 
 
(14a)  B communicates with A. 
 
(14b)  A thinks, that B communicates with A. 
 If there were no difference between the situations expressed by (14a) and (14b) then there are 
no rules by which the term ’to communicate’ can be correctly applied. Where the possibility 




 This discussion tried to show that analysis should play an operative role in consolidating a 
discipline. But analyses could not be achieved in a conceptual vacuum: they always 
presuppose a method and some basical concepts that serve as analysans. Moreover, there are 
many kinds of analyses that have the same logical structure but different presuppositions. 
This paper tried to explicate some of them. After ascertaining the necessity of analysis, the 
discussion applied its analytical methods on a so-called axiom of human communication, 
namely on the one which states that one cannot not communicate. If only an analysis of this 
kind would had been attempted earlier, then the axiom in question would not be so evident 
nowadays, because the analysis presented in this paper shows that the axiom is either false or 
meaningless. But it’s evident, that in the process of consolidating a discipline, an imperious 
misconception could be as beneficial as an appropriate design at times. 
  
 
             NOTES 
 
i
 For the formalism of thematic roles see, for example,  Bornkessel 2006. 
ii
 There are many objections against intensional equality in connection with definitions, see Kripke for a 
classical framing.  
iii
 This is Mandelbrot’s definition of fractals, see Mandelbrot 1983,15. 
iv
 Mathematics is overrun with definitions of this kind, consider for example the definitions of entities like 
’number’, ’set’, or complex ones like ’Triadic Cantor Dust’ (See, for example Edgar 2008). The so-called 
intensional problems with definitions could be illustrated by a seemingly simple example. Consider a definition 
of ’2’ as (i). 
 
(i) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹2;‹1+1›› 
 
Of course here ’definition’ means the fixation of an equality, but this equality surely cannot be intensional: no  
body thinks normally that ’2’ means ’1+1’, and it’s easy to see that the number of equality-definitions for ’2’ is 
potentially infinite. But the notion that ’2’ and ’1+1’ refers to the same object, as in the case of extensional 
equality, seems to be problematic (at least for nominalists). This example represents the main problem with 
methodological definitions, and arguing for ‹communication;‹information processing›› is none the worse hard 
that arguing for ‹2;‹1+1››. 
v
 In most cases ’identity’ signifies identification, which causes serious epistemological problems.  
vi
 This method goes back to von Wright’s procedure in connection with the Kantian idea of ’Ought entails Can’ 
(WRIGHT 1963). 
vii
 Quine’s slogan is ’to be is to be the value of a variable’, which could narrow the scope of x in the case of (11), 
see Quine 1953. 
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 Here ’to include’ should be considered as a set-theoretical relation, where the included set is closer than the 
includer.  
ix
 Among others, absurdities of this kind could have been led logicians to forbid using the substantive verb as 
predicate. 
x
 Of course, as it was already mentioned, in logic ’to be’ and ’exist’ could not be used as a predicate, but in 
ordinary language substantive verbs are often functioning as predicates. This paper should not discuss on the 
topic of the so-called logical disfunctions of ordinary languages.  
xi
 So identity here should be considered intensionally, because the extensional interpretation of the same 
statement evokes serious philosophical problems that could not be discussed here.  
xii
 See for example Psalm 19:  „The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands.  
Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they reveal knowledge. They have no speech, they use 




goes out into all the earth, their words to the ends of 
the world.” 
xiii
 Or ‹x› ‹Fx   Gx› 
xiv
 Or ‹x› ฀‹Fx   Gx› 
xv
 This, naturally, does not mean that (12) could not be criticized per se, but in this form the statement seems 
more contentless than problematic.   
xvi
 The basis of this interpretation is the original text of Watzlawick et al (1967), Ch 2, pp 48-51.   
xvii
 According to Watzlawick, communication should be conceived as message-units, so communications are the 
elements of interactions that consist of a finite number of communications (messages).  
xviii
 The Wikipedia entry on Watzlawick suggests a more elementary interpretation: „Every behavior is a kind of 
communication. Because behavior does not have a counterpart (there is no anti-behavior), it is not possible not 
to communicate.” The entry refers to Bateson (1972) in connection with this interpretation.  
xix
 This is to say that if to be a human agent entails to behave and to behave entails to communicate than to be 
a human agent entails to communicate.  
xx
 It does not mean that counter-examples could not be easily found. For example no one could reasonably 
state that a sleeping agent behaves. Watzlawick of course states that a behaviour need not be conscious. Then 
any observable state of an agent could be conceived as behaviour, which is absurd, because, for example, then 
a dead agent’s observable states should be comprehended as behaviour.  Of course in ordinary , and 
sometimes in scientific languages any corporeal action is called behaviour, for example, the behaviour of 
subatomic particles in a Wilson-chamber. But then any change could be described as behaviour, which means 
that the meaning of change and the meaning of behaviour is one and the same, and, according to Occam’s 
razor, a scientific language does not need more expressions than it is necessary.  
xxi
 One of the most articulate framing of this logical assumption is from Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form:  
„Distinction is perfect continence. That is to say, a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with separate 
sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing the boundary. (...). Once a 
distinction is drawn, the spaces, states, or contents on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be 
indicated. There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents are seen to 
differ in value. Thus the calling of the name can be identified with the value of the content.” (SPENCER-BROWN 
1972, p1). 
xxii
 Just like the statement that ’Every basilica in Europe is a cathedral’.  
xxiii
 Interestingly enough that a German website dedicated to Watzlawick delineates a logically different version 
of the axiom, which runs as follows: "Man kann nicht nicht kommunizieren, denn jede Kommunikation (nicht 
nur mit Worten) ist Verhalten und genauso wie man sich nicht nicht verhalten kann, kann man nicht nicht 
kommunizieren." (Paul Watzlawick Website http://www.paulwatzlawick.de/axiome.html). This (unauthentic) 
interpretation states that all communication is behaviour (instead of the original which states that all 
behaviour is communication). However, this argumentation is inconclusive because it allows behaviours that is 
not communications:   
 
(i)  ‹x› Fx  ฀G‹x› 
(ii)  ‹x› Hx  ฀G‹x› 
(iii)  ‹‹x› ‹Gx  Fx› 
 
xxiv
 In many-valued logics there are more than 2 values (true and false), and, for example, in a calculus of 
Lukasiewicz the number of truth-values could be potentially infinite.  
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 There are theories that postulate so-called inner communications, but the question may be raised whether 
they are communications or not. The author of this paper thinks that inner communications could not be 
conceived with the concepts of self-reference, because communication could not be reflexive, since the verb 
’to communicate’ ordinary needs at least two arguments. For example, Steve could not communicate with 
himself, but his father-role could communicate with his child-role, or his brain could communicate with his 
retina, and so on. Of course, the analytical level of a person should not be confused with the analytical level of 
his (psychological or sociological) roles or with the analytical level of his organs etc. The consideration that 
communications could be described in more than one analytical level is very important here, and the system-
theory could be helpful in explicating these questions, see, for example Luhmann 1984.  
xxvi
 There are possible world semantics for fictional and impossible worlds as well, see, for example,  Dolezel 
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Theelectronically mediated communication has transformed our notion 
of the relation between place and community. With a greater proportion of our 
communicative acts taking place via electronic media, physical co1presence, the 
co1located interpersonal relations are diminishing as determinants of the nature of 
human interactions. This paper argues that the electronically mediated 
communication contributes to the construction of new, mediated forms of 
communities which are based on the interaction or operational synthesis of virtual 
and physical communities. The appearance of these new forms of communities 
leads to a new conceptualization of the relation between self and community. The 
aim of this paper is to show that the medium of the mediatization and new 
conceptualization of community is a specific pictorial language of electronically 
mediated communication, the semantic structure of which offers new 
opportunities to grasp and understand the complex notion of new mediated 
communities and to adopt the idea of a new global, community building language 




 electronically mediated communication, mediated 







Linguistic communication is a creative process which determines our personality and identity 
through our communication roles forming each other. Moreover, the human mind is indeed a 
communicative system the structure of which is affected by prevailing technologies of social 
communication. That is to say, there is a specific inner relation between the communicative 
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structure of our minds and the communication technologies which can be regarded as 
dominant in certain cultures. 
This inner relation can be shown in all major historical changes in dominant communicative 
technologies, from the change1over to literacy to the development of the dominance of 
electronically mediated communication. In this essay, I consider the above assumption by the 
investigation of the effects that are produced on our conceptualization of community by the 
use of electronic media. To clarify the theoretical foundations of this new conceptualization, 
I take the hypothesis as a starting point that the expansion of electronic communication 
technologies – including both monologic technologies (radio, television, the internet) and 
dialogic technologies (mobile telephone) 1 has transformed our notion of the relation between 
place and community. With a greater proportion of our communicative acts taking place via 
electronic media, physical co1presence, the co1located interpersonal relations are diminishing 
as determinants of the nature of human interactions.  
It seems that in the space of electronic media, community should be understood as a 
mediated network of interactions between individuals who uniformly accept and apply some 
rules for the communicative actions aiming at the effective exchange of information. In other 
words, there is an inner relation between  the  criteria of community and  the  global and  
local conditions for an effective method of information exchange. And these global and local 
conditions transform our notions surrounding the structure and life of community. 
The electronically mediated communication, as an inherent part of real life in today’s world, 
contributes to the construction of new, mediated forms of communities which are based on 
the interaction or operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities. The appearance 
of these new forms of communities leads to the new conceptualization of the relation 
between self and community. In the age of electronically mediated communication, the 
essence of community is a kind of networked individualism in which the networked 
individuals can chose their own communities, rather than are fitted into them with others 
involuntarily. Therefore the new, mediated form of community implies an individual1center 
existence and weaker social ties. The new technologies foster communication links outside 
the individuals’ immediate social surrounds.  
Accordingly, electronic communication creates a new context in which our notions of culture, 
community, society, human interactions become more complex. These more complex notions 
can be regarded as the bases of the idea of the global and local information communities in 
which the communication attitudes of a person are determined by their impression of their 
self as permanently available individual whose communicative acts are embedded in a 
special information net. 
 
The aim of this paper is to show the basis and effects of this process by examining the 
following propositions: 
 
1. The expansion of electronically mediated communication leads to the appearance of 
new, mediated forms of communities. 
2. The medium of the mediatization and new conceptualization of community is a 
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Our conceptualization of community, when transformed by the use of electronic media, is 
embedded strongly in the associative system of conceptual relations that represent the 
network of various communicative acts, that is the various situations of information 
exchange. With such a conceptualization of mediated community is conceived as a network 
of communicative interactions. I want to argue here that the ways of understanding of the 
interactions between virtual and physical communities move beyond the traditional 
sociological conceptualization of community1as1interpersonal towards a conceptualization of 
mediated communities that are based on the interaction or the operational synthesis of virtual 
and physical communities. 
Just as traditional theories of community regard community and society as distinct forms, it 
is also easy to consider physical and virtual communities as mutually exclusive forms of 
social organization. In this view, physical community can exist only by virtue of physical co1
location in space, and is based on people’s natural association through sameness and 
residential solidarity. Virtual communities created by electronically mediated communication, 
however, attempt to break some of the boundaries of geographic location, gender, and 
ethnicity established in physical communities. In other words, physical communities are 
based on shared social and physical boundaries, whereas virtual communities are based on 
shared social practices and interest. 
Considering the influence of mediated communication on our community1concept, however, 
many theorists believe that we need a synthesis of physical and virtual communities in order 
to truly inhabit our experiences. Castells (2000), for example, holds that we need a “bridge” 
between physical and virtual places in order to unify our experience, because virtual 
communities only deal in fragmented individuals when they are opposed to real life.  Others, 
like Etzioni (2001), Walls (1993), Katz and Rice (2002), Katz et al. (2004), Katz (2007), 
Haythornthwaite (2007), and Haythornthwaite and Kendall (2010) emphasize that the best 
communities are indeed the hybrids of physical and virtual communities. They see the ideal 
communities as virtual communities enhancing physical communities. According to 
Haythornthwaite and Kendall (2010), online interactions not only have positive effects for 
physical, place1based communities, but the intersection between online communication and 
offline world also forms two halves of a support mechanism for communities. For Katz et al. 
(2004, p. 362), since the electronically mediated communication becomes inherently part of 
real life in today’s world, “we need an operational synthesis of virtual and physical 
communities in order to have fulfilling, embodied experiences all of the time”. In this view, 
in the age of electronically mediated communication, the dividing line between virtual and 
physical communities becomes increasingly indistinct. Therefore, as Poster (2001) shows it, 
the mediated individuals imagine their virtual communities as real.  That is, the role of 
communication as meaningful and value1based in virtual communities also works to 
construct physical communities as well.  
It is obvious that with this new synthesis of virtual and physical communities, electronically 
mediated communication contributes to a new construction of the self. The mediatization of 
communities leads to fractured and fragmented selves, because it opens up many other 
possible communities in which to participate. The new communication technologies enable 
individuals to participate in alterior systems of value, belief, and desires. As Gergen (2003, p. 
111) notes: “New affective bonds are created outside one’s social surrounds. The result is 
that the centered sense of a bounded self slowly gives way to a “multiphrenia” of partial and  
conflicted senses of self. Identity becomes fluid, shifting in a chameleon1like way from one  
social context to another”.    
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Thanks to these changes, the networked individual is attached to the place and position 
appointed by his own social ties less and less. Through his multi1channel communicative acts 
he can become acquainted with more and more communal forms, ways of life, traditions and 
values in the light of which he can choose more deliberately from among the competing local 
communities. And this more deliberate choice becomes a part of the more and more complex 
and multi1layered identity of the networked individual. As Meyrowitz (2005, p. 28) writes on 
the multiple, multi1layered, fluid, and endlessly adjustable senses of the media1networked 
individuals’ identity:  
 
“Rather than needing to choose between local, place1defined identities and more distant 
ones, we can have them all, not just in rapid sequence but in overlapping experiences. We 
can attend a local zoning board meeting, embodying the role of local concerned citizen, 
as we cruise the internet on a wireless1enabled laptop enacting other, non1local identities.  
And we can merge the two as we draw on distant information to inform the local board of 
how other communities handle similar issues and regulations.  All the while, we can 
remain accessible to friends, family, and colleagues from anywhere via a text1message 
enabled mobile phone.” 
 
By using the electronic communication technologies, a networked individual becomes a part 
of a network of interactions between humans who uniformly accept and apply some rules for 
the communicative acts aiming at the effective exchange of information. In other words, the 
media1networked individuals become members of a virtual community that is determined 
both by the global and the local conditions for an effective method of information exchange.   
Regarding the conceptualization of this new virtual community, Green (2003), for example,   
argues   for   a   new   view  of  community,   in  which  the   significance   of   locality and 
interpersonality recedes to the benefit of symbolic processes.  As Green (2003, p. 55) points 
out:  “As is the case with internet and ‘virtual’ communities then, understandings of mobile 
‘communities’ should move beyond the conceptualisation of ‘communities1as1interest1
groups’ (secured via the authentication of the embodied liberal individual and their ‘right to 
privacy’), and indeed beyond a traditional sociological conceptualisation of ‘communities1as1
interpersonal1and1co1located’ (secured via relations based on face1to1face interaction in 
kinship or social commonality). Rather, we should move towards a conceptualisation of 
‘communities1as1trust1processes’ (secured via the mutual, reciprocal and multiple negotiation 
of mediated, interpersonal, and organization uncertainty and risk.)”  
This new conceptualization moves beyond the traditional definition of community, according 
to which, as Green (2003, p. 53) writes, community “as an ideal type of relation 
corresponding to “natural will”, is distinguished by an appeal to a totality of cultural history 
in the collective memory of tradition, is defined through common property, family, custom 
and fellowship, and is bound by consensus, language and ritual”. 
The basis of this conceptualization is a complex system of associative conceptual relations 
that includes our concept of community, and integrates the conceptual representations of 
human interactions which determine the life of community both in a direct and indirect way. 
The medium of the new conceptualization is a specific pictorial language, the semantic 
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One of the most important criteria of the new, more deliberate attachment to the local is the 
deliberate application of the ways of usage that create new local communities in the age of 
electronic communication. And these new ways of usage are rooted in the communication 
language of electronic media that can be regarded as a result of the convergence of the 
characteristics of oral and written communication. Thus we consider the new linguistic 
culture of electronic communication as one of the most important conditions of the 
conceptual and the social convergences experienced in the space of electronic media. It 
seemed that this new linguistic culture is the basic both of the global perspective created by 
electronic communication and the cohesion of the new, mediated communities that are 
strengthened by deliberate choices of the networked individuals.  
In this new linguistic culture, the original social function of language, namely, the building 
and maintaining of the cohesion of human community, becomes important development, 
because in the print societies, language has got far from this original function as a 
consequence of the appearance of the oral1literal bilingualism and the linguistic asymmetry 
that is rooted in the social dominance of the standard dialect of literacy. That is, instead of 
strengthening the community cohesion, this bilingualism and asymmetry disintegrates 
primary human communities since the use of their own dialects is overtly stigmatized in the 
light of the socially preferred standard dialect of literacy. This communication culture that 
forces the whole society and all communities to use one preferred language variety goes 
against individual biologically encoded need of belonging to a primary community. 
The original social function of language, however, has survived this linguistic asymmetry 
developed in print societies. People hold to their everyday use of language, even if they judge 
their own dialectical varieties incorrect under the pressure of the overt prestige of the 
standard. Since the members of small local communities generally communicate with one 
another orally, the linguistic conventions characterizing these communities have survived in 
the age of standard linguistic varieties too. In these small local communities the importance 
of cohesion1strengthening, local values outstrips the external social values that are 
symbolized by the standard forms of written communication. This phenomenon is 
experienced especially in small, isolated rural and suburban communities where the prestige 
of the non1standard variety of usage can be regarded, at the same time, as a symbol of 
communal identity.  
In the space of electronic communication, literacy that generated the asymmetry of linguistic 
norms of  oral  and  written  communication  seems  to be losing of  its  power  and  the 
prestige of  the identity1strengthening ways of usage characterizing small communities and 
group grows. The expansion of the non1standard varieties of language preferred by the 
networked individuals is accelerated by the use of electronic media (internet, mobile 
telephone). This process leading to decline of the prestige of literacy is accelerated by the 
convergence of the oral and the written communication technologies that affects usage since 
the new kind of orality created by the use of radio and television or, especially, use of 
multimedia messaging, the synchronous1complementary transmission of speech, text and 
pictures in the space of mobile and internet communication. 
There are well1perceptible, concrete signs of this convergence of the features of the oral and 
the written usage. Let us consider the texts that are mediated by the internet or mobile 
telephone! The texts of many e1mail and SMS message actually belong to the domain of 
speech and not to the domain of written texts. The grammatical and stylistic characteristics of  
these messages can be regarded as the marks of a special kind of oral communication. These  
grammatical and stylistic elements, however, are integrated into the texts mediated by new 
communication technologies more deliberately than into the oral utterances. By using these 
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elements, the utterer intends to show that he wishes to accept and apply the norms and the 
rules of a linguistic community organized by e1mail and SMS communication. That is to say, 
he uses these grammatical and stylistic elements of linguistic communication to make it 
unambiguous that he is attached to a community accepting some forms of usage and that this 
attachment is a consequence of a deliberate choice.  
The linguistic forms accepted in this way affect the everyday usage strongly. The use of the 
special linguistic forms of the texts mediated by the new communication technologies lives 
its mark on the written communication and leads to the convergence between orality and 
literacy. What can be regarded as an outcome of this process is the increasingly indistinct 
dividing line between then linguistic characteristics of oral and written communication. A 
new communication language is in the making which integrates the forms of language used 
in oral utterances and in written texts.   
The appearance of the new language of communication can be regarded as a consequence of 
the networked individuals’ deliberate choice who want to join in the global information 
exchange successfully and to express conceptual relations and emotions as a member of a 
small community by using the new linguistic forms. One of the most characteristic features 
of this culture is that the advent of multimedia communication has resulted in a strong 
interaction between picture and language in the process of oral and written messaging.  
As multimedia technology expands, the dividing line between the linguistic characteristics of 
oral and written communication becomes increasingly indistinct. This means that though the 
syntactic features and structure of this new language of communication remind us of the 
linguistic world of oral communication, the new language seems to be more complex in 
terms of its semantic characteristics. Accordingly, the multimedia integration of verbal and 
pictorial elements, or the convergence of the  linguistic features  of  oral and  written 
communication,  contributes  to the transformation  of  the structure of the mind and the 
content of thought by establishing a new communication culture.  
Consequently, by using the term “pictorial language”, I am referring not only to the 
integration of verbal and pictorial components of information exchange, but to the linguistic 
medium of the specific synthesis of the features of conceptual and pictorial thought. The 
pictorial character of the language of electronically mediated communication is rooted in the 
fact that this language includes expressions which refer to complex conceptual relations 
without a conceptual analysis of them. In other words, a new metaphorical language is in the 
making, the function of which is to “show” the world rather than to analyze it.  
By using this language, we want to “make perceptible” the complexity of conceptual 
relations to which we refer. The main intention of a user of this kind of language is to embed 
some conceptual relations in the system of more complex conceptual representations by 
using words that are suitable for making the complexity of newly1revealed conceptual 
relations intelligible. This kind of usage leads, on the one hand, to the appearance of new 
terms in language and, on the other hand, to the novel use of available linguistic elements. In 
the latter process, the meanings of some words multiply with more and more conceptual 
relations. 
This is why the usage of the word “community” entails the intention of understanding of the 
overall or global criteria of community in the age of electronic media. These criteria can be 
attributed to the specific features of communicational space which is globalized by the use of  
television, the Internet, and mobile telephones. In other words, there is an inner relation  
between these criteria and the global conditions for an effective method of information 
exchange. These global conditions (a common information basis, collective trust relations, 
etc.) transform our notions surrounding the structure and life of community.  
Focusing on the inner relation between the new conceptualization of the criteria of 
community and our  notions  regarding the global conditions  for an effective method of 
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information exchange, we can suggest,  for example,  the  following definition:  community 
is  a  network of interactions between individuals who uniformly accept and apply some rules 
for the communicative acts aiming at the effective exchange of information. 
Of course, our complex notion of community urges us to form many other definitions. And it 
is obvious that these definitions approach the community1organizing role of information in 
different way. They have, however, one thing in common: they all must be founded on the 
analysis of the conceptual and linguistic changes that transform the structure of our minds in 
the mediated communities of the electronic era. Because these linguistic changes can be 
regarded as bases of the mediatization of communities and the adopting of the idea of a 
global, community building language in the new media space. But what kind of language 
would best serve as a global language in the network of mediated communities? Etzioni 
(2008), for example, argues for adopting English as a shared, secondary global language in 
the information age.  As Etzioni (2008, p. 124) points out: “a key element of building a 
global community atop local communities requires that the various nations involved choose 
the same second language”. This second language, of course, does not replace the 
particularistic, identity constituting primary languages of local and national communities, 
rather it is best considered as an additional language. Nevertheless an opposition can be 
experienced to adopting such an additional language in many nations. According to Etzioni 
(2008, p. 124), “this opposition often conflates preventing English penetration into the 
primary language with resisting it as second language”. Whereas this opposition, as Etzioni 
(2008, p. 124) writes, “ delays overcoming the “babel” effects at great cost to the 
transparency of global laws, the promotion of shared understandings, and the efficiency of 
economic transactions”. 
In my view, as a global process, the appearance of the pictorial characteristic of primary 
communal languages can contribute to the adoption of an additional global language, because 
this process, as we have seen, creates the foundations of the convergences of different usages 
and languages.   The  global expansion  of   the  pictorial   language  of  electronic  
communication  can  be regarded as the basis of the idea of a global information community 
in which the communication attitudes of a person are determined by his impression of his self 
as a permanently available person whose communicative acts are embedded in a global 
information net. In other words, it is by accelerating and mediating linguistic changes leading 
to a complex notion of global community that electronically mediated communication 
becomes a source of, as Meyrowitz (2005, p. 30) writes, the “fusion of local and global 







This essay holds that in the information age, the medium of the mediatization and new 
conceptualization of community is a specific, pictorial language of electronically mediated  
communication. The global linguistic changes traceable to the use of electronic 
communications technologies lead to a linguistic galaxy which can contribute to the  
development of higher level of human cohesion. This paper adopts the assumption that 
through the appearance of this linguistic galaxy, a new, global community comes into 
existence which is based on the operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities. As 
demonstrated, with the worldwide expansion of the new communication culture, the original 
social function of language, namely, the building and maintaining of the cohesion of human 
communities, becomes important development. 
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